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THE VIEW FROM THE AMBASSADOR’S OFFICE

“Look at that; they are burning banks,” complained the man wearing
cowboy boots as he watched CNN on a television set in his office at the
United States Embassy in Mexico City. Black smoke billowed out of a
branch of Banco Santander in Mar del Plata, Argentina. “Why does everyone
hate globalization so much?” asked Antonio Garza, Jr., United States
Ambassador to Mexico in the administration of U.S. President George W.
Bush, formerly Texas Secretary of State under then Governor George W.
Bush.1 The news coverage showed Argentine President Nestor Kirschner,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and football legend Diego Maradona
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1. Antonio O. Garza, Jr., COUNCIL AM. AMBASSADORS,
https://www.americanambassadors.org/members/antonio-o-garza-jr (last visited Mar. 14, 2022).
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cheering on crowds—estimated at 25,000 people—to protest yanqui
imperialism in the form of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas treaty
under negotiation.2 As Nikolas Kozloff wrote:
Located 230 miles south of Buenos Aires, Mar del Plata is nominally
a peaceful Argentine beach resort. But during the Fourth Summit of
the Americas in November 2005, the city was burned into a riot zone
as activists protested the presence of President George Bush. The
protests included piqueteros, anarchists, and community and labor
groups. At one point, demonstrators hurled a Molotov cocktail and
set a bank on fire. In an effort to get the situation under control, police
fired tear gas.3
The protests in Mar del Plata were part of the many anti-globalization
demonstrations that began more than a decade before. In the south of Mexico
on January 1, 1994, the first day the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)4 went into force, the Zapatista rebellion took root.5 Later, there
were protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, 6
against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in
Washington D.C.,7 anti-Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)

2. MICHAEL REID, FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN AMERICA’S SOUL
309 (2006).
3. NIKOLAS KOZLOFF, HUGO CHÁVEZ: OIL, POLITICS, AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE
UNITED STATES 73 (2006).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA]. Congress approved NAFTA by means of the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
3311 (2006)). NAFTA went into force on January 1, 1994. Exec. Order No. 12,889, 58 Fed. Reg.
69, 681 (Dec. 27, 1993).
5. Because the EZLN [Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional] uprising directly
pointed at the exclusionary and exploitative practices of the Mexican socioeconomic and
political systems, it contributed to the weakening of the one-party regime during the
latter’s years. It also contributed to the weakening of the prosperous façade that the
regime had tried to create by implementing economic reforms that allowed the country
to become a member of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
MARÍA INCLÁN, THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT AND MEXICO’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION:
MOBILIZATION, SUCCESS, AND SURVIVAL 3 (2018).
6. “By the time tens of thousands of people spilled into streets of Seattle to protest against a
meeting of WTO officials and member-state representatives, the organization had evolved into a
powerful, secretive, and corporate-influenced overseer of government’s mandate to protect
citizens and the environment from corporate harms.” JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE
PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 22-23 (2004).
7. “Virtually every major meeting of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
the World Trade Organization is now the scene of conflict and turmoil.” JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3 (2002).
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protests in Québec City, 8 the anti-Group of Seven protests in Genoa,9 and
finally, the chaos in Mar del Plata.10
With each successive trade agreement,11 institutional annual meeting,
and global trade negotiation round that aimed to create the institutional
underpinnings of the global economy, violence erupted in the streets outside
the meeting forum.12 Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz wrote:
International bureaucrats—the faceless symbols of the world
economic order—are under attack everywhere. Formerly uneventful
meetings of obscure technocrats discussing mundane subjects such
as concessional loans and trade quotas have now become the scene
of raging street battles and huge demonstrations.13
The events unfolding on television on that day in November 2005
signaled the beginning of the end of the Washington Consensus,14 the policy
promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the
United States Department of Treasury. These prescriptions encompassed,

8. The FTAA called for “the establishment of a hemispheric free trade area that would
cover the whole continent and that would be, from an economic and political, perspective, the
most significant express of Pan-Americanism.” MARÍA BELÉN OLMOS GIUPPONI, RETHINKING
FREE TRADE, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICA 21 (2017).
9. Alessandra Stanley & David E. Sanger, Italian Protester Is Killed by Police at Genoa
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A16. See generally James Gerstenzang, Summit Opens
Amid Deadly Street Protests, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2001; Richard Boudreaux & Marjorie Miller,
Genoa on Minds of Protestors, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2001, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jul-18-mn-23619-story.html; Robert Fife, This
One Could be the Last, NAT’L POST, July 21, 2001, at A1; Aaron Bernstein et al., Time to
Regroup, BUS. WK., Aug. 6, 201, at 26; see also Michael Elliott, Death in Genoa, TIME (July 30,
2001), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1000417,00.html.
10. KOZLOFF, supra note 3, at 73.
11. In addition to focusing on the FTAA, the U.S. Government pursued a parallel strategy of
concluding other trade agreements to benefit U.S. exporters and consumers. See James Cooper,
Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 957 (1999). Pacts like the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement and CAFTA have gone
into force and the U.S.-Peru and U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreements have been successfully
negotiated.
12. A study by the World Development Movement highlighted that between 1999 and 2000,
protests against IMF-dictated policies occurred in 13 developing countries and included at least 15
organized strikes, 29 demonstrations, and 16 riots or other violent incidents. See Jessica
Woodroffe & Mark Ellis-Jones, States of Unrest: Resistance to IMF Policies in Poor Countries
(Sept. 28, 2000), http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27d/053.html; see also Carol M. Rose,
Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 691 (2006).
13. STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 3.
14. The Washington Consensus as I originally formulated it was not written as a policy
prescription for development: it was a list of policies that I claimed were widely held in
Washington to be widely desirable in Latin America as of the date the list was compiled,
namely the second half of 1989.
See John Williamson, The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development, Institute
of International Economics, Lecture in series “Practitioners of Development” 1 (Jan. 13, 2004).
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“three main elements: macroeconomic stability (smaller fiscal deficits), a
diminished governmental role in the economy (privatization and
deregulation), and greater openness to the outside (free trade and an ‘open’
approach to foreign capital).”15 The Washington Consensus was to be
achieved through fiscal discipline: the reordering public expenditure
priorities, liberalizing inward foreign direct investment, liberalizing interest
rates, and liberalizing financial services. It can further be achieved through
tax reform, a competitive exchange rate, deregulation, privatization, and
trade liberalization. These neoliberal policies had been implemented in the
United Kingdom during the Thatcher government and in the United States
during the Reagan administration.16 They were also imposed on the
developing world as a form of “conditionality”17 once the Cold War was over
in exchange for loans and grants.
As part of this global parade of mass protests and demonstrations against
globalization, the battle in Mar del Plata was also a battle for Latin America’s
soul: Would there be more extraction,18 plunder,19 and suffering or
something different? The neoliberal model of accumulation,20 economic
growth, trickle-down benefits, and extraction (of minerals, agricultural
products, and raw materials, profits, license fees, royalties) was now
15. MARIO ESTEBAN CARRANZA, SOUTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA OR FREE TRADE
AREA OF THE AMERICAS? OPEN REGIONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA 49 (2000).
16. In 1979, a Conservative government was elected in the UK under the leadership of
Margaret Thatcher that abandoned its party’s postwar commitment to Keynesianism,
a mixed-ownership economy and fairly generous welfare state in favour of monetarism,
privatization, low taxes for wealthier people and a reduced social state. The following
year the election of Ronald Reagan as President of the USA ushered in a tougher version
of the same policies.
COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 16 (2011).
17. WORLD BANK, REVIEW OF WORLD BANK CONDITIONALITY (2005).
18. See ALEXANDER DUNLOP & JOSTEIN JAKOBSEN, THE VIOLENT TECHNOLOGIES OF
EXTRACTION: POLITICAL ECOLOGY, CRITICAL AGRARIAN STUDIES AND THE CAPITALIST
WORLDEATER 1 (2020) (“Total extractivism denotes how the techno-capitalist world system
harbors a rapacious appetite of all life—total consumption of human and non-human resources—
that destructively reconfigures the earth.”).
19. Plunder is defined as a noun meaning “pillaging” and “something taken by force, theft, or
fraud: loot.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/plunder (last visited Jan. 11, 2022; see also UGO MATTEI & LAURA
NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 11 (2008) (“An overly broad definition
of plunder would be the inequitable distribution of resources by the strong at the expense of the
weak.”).
20. DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2003) (exploring “accumulation by
dispossession”); see also Victor D. Lippit, Social Structure of Accumulation Theory, Paper
prepared for the Conference on Growth and Crisis: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory and
Analysis, National University of Ireland, Galway (Nov. 2-4, 2006), https://economics.ucr.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/VictorLippit10-20-06.pdf.
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auditioning for the role of Hemispheric norm. But those who were
demonstrating on the streets were not interested in the Washington
Consensus, nor in what the United States’ free market friendly and non-state
interventionist approach proposed.21 U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit
to the Fourth Summit of the Americas slowed down the globalization process
and marked a diplomatic defeat for the reformist, neoliberal policies of
Hemispheric integration, harmonization, and liberalization. 22 What played
out of the streets of Mar del Plata was also an intra-Latin American struggle
over development models.
President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela had been gunning for the FTAA
and U.S. influence in the Americas for years.23 He wanted his Bolivarian
alternative—the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América24
(ALBA)—to partner with Bolivia, Cuba, and eventually Ecuador, as well as
with smaller Caribbean island countries—to become the region’s trade
organization of choice. Even if Latin American and Caribbean states did not
join ALBA, Chávez could, at a minimum, slow the continued U.S.-led efforts
to create an FTAA modeled after NAFTA.25 After all, both the multilateral
and bilateral free trade agreements that the United States entered into after
NAFTA, such as the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),26 the United States-Chile Free Trade
21. “Clearly, in Latin America liberalization and reform have not yielded the growth results
everyone had hoped for, while they have been associated with—and, to some degree, cause—a
sharp increase in inequality.” Paul Krugman, Inequality and Redistribution, 31, 39 in THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Narcis
Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
22. “If there is a consensus today about what strategies are most likely to promote the
development of the poorest countries in the world, it is this: there is no consensus except that the
Washington Consensus did not provide the answer.” Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is There a PostWashington Consensus Consensus? in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED:
TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 41 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
23. See Joel D. Hirst, A Guide to ALBA, AMERICAS Q., https://www.americasquarterly.org/aguide-to-alba/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
24. What is the ALBA?, ALBA INFO (Mar. 20, 2019), https://albainfo.org/what-is-the-alba/.
25. James M. Cooper, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Its Legacy on the
Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes, 43 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 157, 161-62 (2012)
[hereinafter NAFTA Legacy]; Cooper, supra note 11, at 964. Cf. KEVIN P. GALLAGHER ET AL.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY, THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: LESSONS FROM
NAFTA 5 (2009) (“NAFTA and the other trade agreements based on the NAFTA template need
deep reform”).
26. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Central
America-Dom. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA] (implemented by the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005)). Robert Lutz has explained:
The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement was born of
controversy. From questions about the feasibility of teaming a huge developed country
economy with a region of small, uneven developing country economies to those raising
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Agreement,27 and the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, were
very similar to NAFTA.28 Since Ronald Reagan, there has been a hope for a
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, a trade area that encompasses the
entire Western Hemisphere with every country, save Cuba, a member.29 On
the morning of November 4, 2005, however, it was clear that no
Hemispheric-wide trade agreement was in the offing—at least not a U.S.-led
version. This accounts for United States Ambassador Tony Garza’s
displeasure as he continued to share his dismay over the mayhem on the street
in Mar del Plata.
The United States eventually retreated to the North American
marketplace,30 as evidenced by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA),31 the successor agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement. This article explores the role that multilateral (specifically
among Canada, Mexico, and the United States) and bilateral (specifically
between the United States and Mexico) agreements have played along the
border and concludes that neither agreement make the border safer, nor make
its working people more prosperous. The border remains a contested Wild
West of sorts. Part I of this article explores the Washington Consensus and

the importance of integrating labor and environmental standards into the agreement, the
debate continues about how to structure world trade to benefit all strata of society and
improve the political stability and economic conditions of poor countries.
Robert E. Lutz, CAFTA and Commercial Law Reform in the Americas: An Introduction, 12 SW.
J.L. TRADE AM. 177, 177 (2006).
27. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., Sept. 3, 2003, 114 Stat. 1526.
28. United States-Peru Free Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., Apr. 12, 2006, 121 Stat.
1455 (implemented by United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act S.
Rept. 110-249 (2007)).
29. Bryan Riley, Revisiting NAFTA: Ronald Reagan on Free Trade in North America,
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 20, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/revisiting-naftaronald-reagan-free-trade-north-america (quoting President Reagan, “Our goal . . . must be a day
when the free flow of trade, from the tip of Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle, unites the people
of the Western Hemisphere in a bond of mutually beneficial exchange.”).
30. The decoupling of the U.S. economy from that of China resulted in the reshoring of jobs
back to North America during the Trade War of 2018 and 2019:
Separating the effects of the various considerations supporting the reduction or
elimination of Chinese supply chains may be difficult and will not be the same among
all business sectors and individual enterprises, but it seems to me that the changes they
are bringing about are both cataclysmic and irreversible. In my view, the advent of the
USMCA has made this supply chain revision less difficult and complex than it might
otherwise have been.
DAVID A. GANTZ, NORTH AMERICA’S SHIFTING SUPPLY CHAINS: THE USMCA, COVID-19, AND
THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR 25 (2020).
31. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Preamble, Nov. 30, 2018 [hereinafter
USMCA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canadaagreement.
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the culture of accumulation, plunder, and extractivism32 that it has
engendered. Part II delves into various economic integration pacts that are
part of the Washington Consensus starting with the NAFTA, then the
Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), and finally, the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement.
Robert Lutz has reminded us that “harmonization of legal rules,
procedure and even legal culture is a general goal, and inevitably a byproduct of such institutions as the North American Free Trade Agreement.”33
This convergence lays the framework for the Border Industrial Complex
(BIC) and the complex, often for-profit relations of private, non-state actors
as they navigate among, and at times act on behalf of, sovereign states.34 Part
III explores how the trilateral mechanisms that partner countries used to make
the U.S.-Mexico border less contested have not made the border any safer.35
These trade regimes and regional arrangements have, however, increased
corporate welfare.36
In short, the policies associated with NAFTA’s free market, the
neoliberal economics, and the Washington Consensus favor multinational
corporations,37 for-profit, non-state actors who lower labor and
environmental standards, facilitate foreign direct investment and repatriate
corporate profits through the elimination of capital flow controls. Together,
adherent countries harmonize government procurement practices,
standardize customs procedures, reduce security paperwork, and protect
property rights—all with the goal of increasing profits. It is no surprise that
the resulting democracy deficit,38 challenge to national sovereignty, and lack
of regard for Indigenous Peoples, labor rights, and environmental concerns,

32. See MARISTELLA SVAMPA, NEO-EXTRACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA (2019); see also
EDUARDO GUDYNAS, EXTRACTIVISMS: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY at ix (2021)
(exploring the negative local impacts including ecological and health degradation and violence,
and the attendant spillover consequences that redefines democracy and justice).
33. Robert E. Lutz, Law, Procedure and Culture in Mexico under the NAFTA: The
Perspective of a NAFTA Panelist, 3 SW. J.L. TRADE AM. 391, 392 (1996).
34. See James M. Cooper, Same As It Ever Was: The Tijuana River Sewage Crisis, Non-State
Actors, and the State, 5 CARDOZO INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175 (2022).
35. Measuring illegal entries into the United States is highly inaccurate by the U.S.
government. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, OPTIONS FOR ESTIMATING ILLEGAL ENTRIES AT THE U.S.–
MEXICO BORDER 1-2 (Alicia Carriquiry & Malay Majmundar, eds. 2013).
36. Doug Bandow, Corporate Welfare Lives On and On, CATO INST. (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/commentary/corporate-welfare-lives.
37. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, NAVIGATING THE FREE TRADE-FAIR TRADE FAULT-LINES 4
(2021).
38. See SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 56 (2011).
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have angered the working class in Latin America and other developed
countries.39
A similar process of marginalization, non-representation, and frustration
with the free trade negotiating process has also come to typify protests
against globalization in developed and developing countries alike.40 The
trade regimes, as evidenced by the results in the aftermath of the trade
agreements that the United States has signed with its Hemispheric partners,
have not lived up to their promises. 41 When U.S. President Bill Clinton
signed NAFTA, he claimed the deal “promote[d] more growth, more
equality, better preservation of the environment and a greater possibility of
world peace.”42 Neither jobs nor prosperity through the trickle-down benefits
of this regime of globalization have resulted.43 For the AFL-CIO, “the
enduring result of NAFTA has been just the opposite: stagnant wages,
increasing inequality, and weakened social protections in all three
countries.”44
For Saskia Sassen, this is “a regime associated with increased levels of
concentrated wealth, poverty, and inequality worldwide.”45 Pollution and
other environmental degradation also continued as the United States

39. See Adam Warner, A Brief History of The Anti-Globalization Movement, 12 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 237, 238 (2005). See also Nick Carbone, Fight for Your Right:
Antiglobalization, TIME (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2096654_2096653_2096684,00.ht
ml; Environment: A Brief History of the Anti-globalization Movement, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 7,
2017), https://www.dw.com/en/a-brief-history-of-the-anti-globalization-movement/g-39573255.
40. “If the wave of rebellions and social movements spreading unevenly across the South
American continent draws on long-standing insurrectionary traditions there, it can also be directly
attributed to the economic dislocations created by the Washington Consensus.” TARIQ ALI,
PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AXIS OF HOPE 32 (2006).
41. “In the countries that followed Washington Consensus policies, economic growth was
limited at best, and disproportionately benefited those at the top.” Narcis Serra et al., Introduction:
From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance, in THE WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2 (Narcis Serra & Joseph
E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
42. Conor Lynch, America is About to Make a Horrible Mistake All Over Again, SALON
(May 8, 2015, 12:00 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2015/05/08/america_is_about_to_make_a_horrible_mistake_all_over_aga
in/#:~:text=On%20the%20signing%20of%20NAFTA%2C%20President%20Clinton%20said,envi
ronment%20and%20a%20greater%20possibility%20of%20world%20peace.
43. See Gordon H. Hanson, Can Trade Work for Workers? The Right Way to Redress Harms
and Redistribute Gains, FOREIGN AFFS. (May/June 2021),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-20/can-trade-work-workers.
44. Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Org., NAFTA at 20, AFL-CIO (Mar. 27, 2014),
https://aflcio.org/reports/nafta-20.
45. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS xxviii (1998).
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outsourced its manufacturing work46 and dumpsites47 abroad. There has been
an attendant “Disneyfication”48 of sorts in which Indigenous cultures die out
to allow a global brand to extract rents, license fees, and other royalties.49 For
Indigenous farmers in Chiapas and other parts of Mexico, NAFTA was “a
death sentence” according to Zapatista revolutionary leader Subcomandante
Marcos.50
However, that was not what the purveyors of the Washington Consensus
intended. Instead, free trade was pitched as a panacea, a cure-all for
underdevelopment and an engine for economic growth for all through trickledown benefits.51 With the trilateral attempts, all boats would rise with better
jobs for workers, efficiencies enjoyed from comparative advantage, and
bigger profits for corporations and their shareholders.52 It is no surprise that
free trade at the U.S.-Mexico border was pursued on both sides with vigor.
That enthusiasm had started before 1989 when the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement went into force.53
NAFTA was created to integrate and unite all of North America,
building on the U.S.-Canada FTA to provide for harmonization, trade
liberalization, and institutional reforms.54 It was not going to be easy to
achieve: “On the whole, NAFTA can be qualified as an asymmetric
46. JOHN R. MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF “FREE TRADE”: NAFTA, WASHINGTON, AND
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ch. 3 (2000).
47. Cf. KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO, NAFTA,
25 (2004)
48. See A Reader’s Guide to Disneyfication, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (Dec. 5, 1998),
https://newint.org/features/1998/12/05/guide/.
49. Don Wallace, “Moana” Is Turning Culture into Cash-Here’s Why it Matters for
Hawai’i, HONOLULU MAG. (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.honolulumagazine.com/moana-isturning-culture-into-cash-heres-why-it-matters-for-hawaii/.
50. Medea Benjamin, Interview: Subcomandante Marcos, in FIRST WORLD: HA! HA! HA!
THE ZAPATISTA CHALLENGE 57, 67 (Elaine Katzenberger ed., 1995).
51. Brian C. Albrecht, Freer Trade and Economic Growth: Evidence of the Relationship,
AM. INST. FOR ECON. RSCH. (July 3, 2019); The Benefits of Free Trade: Addressing Key Myths,
MERCATUS CENTER, GEORGE MASON UNI., https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Benefits-ofFree-Trade_EP_110513.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2022); Denise Froning, The Benefits of Free
Trade: A Guide for Policymakers, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 25, 2000),
https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-benefits-free-trade-guide-policymakers.
52. “Businesses—multinational corporations (MNCs), banks, and small and medium-sized
firms—have been the main agents for economic integration.” ROBERT A. PASTOR, THE NORTH
AMERICAN IDEA: A VISION OF A CONTINENTAL FUTURE 97 (2011).
53. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S., Dec. 22, 1987- Jan. 2, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTA]; United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449 (codified at 19 U.S.C § 2112 (1988)).
54. “The vision of a North American Community goes beyond the rhetoric of good relations
that every leader deploys. Rather it means consigning a widening circle of domestic issues to
trilateral consultation, which over time, could lead to coordinate, and perhaps even unified
policies.” PASTOR, supra note 52, at 147.
AND BEYOND
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agreement since it comprises two developed member states and a ‘developing
nation’ . . . .”55 This was particularly true with a developing country that is
Roman Catholic, Spanish-speaking, of the civil law tradition, and has weak
institutions and corrupt officials which brings the administration of justice
into disrepute.56 Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, Canada was easy to integrate
with because there is rule of law, a common law legal system and English
speaking (but for Quebec) population. Mexico, as a party to a trade pact, was
a different story.57
Trilateralism58 was stronger than two sets of bilateral relationships for
each of the countries. The three countries were aligning their economies to
better scale for global competition. Much of the world was hiving off into
regional trading pacts as the negotiations to end the Uruguay Round of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations were stalling,
imperiling the global trading regime. “The original rationale for the North
American Free Trade Agreement was to further regional integration and to
go beyond what was attainable multilaterally.”59
The European Community was transforming into the European Union
as fifteen countries became one, only to expand to twenty-eight countries
years later (and now twenty-seven due to Brexit).60 The Mercado Commún
del Sur (MERCOSUR),61 the Southern Cone Customs Union, features even
more harmonization beyond the reduction of tariffs. The partner countries

55. OLMOS GIUPPONI, supra note 8, at 125.
During the review period, almost all Mexican corruption cases (especially cases
involving governors, businessmen, functionaries and union leaders) have gone
unpunished. Of the numerous cases of corruption by governors, members of Congress,
judges, lawyers, functionaries and corporate executives, only a handful have gone to trial
and most of those tried have been released. Although increased levels of political
democratization and transparency have contributed to the mass media’s autonomy and
an increasing number of civic organizations that scrutinize politicians —resulting in
increasing numbers of denunciations against corrupt or inefficient politicians—the fact
that most go unpunished, merely increases public frustration, demeaning both democracy
and the rule of law.
Mexico Country Report 2020, BERTELSMANN TRANSPARENCY INDEX, https://btiproject.org/en/reports/country-report/MEX (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
57. James M. Cooper, The Complicated Relationship: A Snapshot of the U.S.-Mexico Border,
Konrad Adenauer Foundation Washington Office (2010), reprinted in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, at 37, 41, http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.20667/.
58. Richard H. Ullman, Trilateralism: “Partnership” for What?, FOREIGN AFFS. (Oct.
1976), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/1976-10-01/trilateralism-partnership-what.
59. Luis de la Calle Pardo, NAFTA Looking Forward, in CANADA AND MEXICO’S
UNFINISHED AGENDA 111, 111 (Alex Bugailiskis & Andrés Rozental eds., 2012).
60. European Commission, The European Union: What it is and What it Does,
https://op.europa.eu/webpub/com/eu-what-it-is/en/ (2021).
61. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the
Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar.
26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041.
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have harmonized their respective customs policies to present a common front
to countries outside their pact.62 ASEAN countries were also discussing plans
for regional trade deals to better coordinate their economies. The AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation group was also discussing more
harmonization as these regional trading blocs proliferated.
Competitiveness in a global context is the common driver behind
forms and rationales of regionalisation, yet it is in the conclusions
drawn for responding action that cause implementations to vary
between each example, as well as between intra-national, international and EU-defined cases. There is thus not just one
recognisable from of ‘new regionalism,’ but there are several. Its
very nature is its diverse, almost post-modern, character, reflecting
varying experiences with, and strategic responses to, a globalising
economy.63
The North American Free Trade Agreement brought the three countries
together to create the foundational international trade architecture—
structures that undergird towards a globalization economy at that regional
level. Trilateralism, a form of multilateralism restricted to three parties, has
been only one of many strategies pursued by states in their international
relations. As Atsushi Tago explained, “Multilateralism requires states to
follow international norms and pay more respect to international institutions;
this is contrasted with unilateralism, where a single state can influence how
international relations can be conducted.”64 But with some relationships and
issues, bilateralism may be the preferred method of making international
relations and the rules in the relationship between states.65 Indeed, the United
States is not the only country to follow this pragmatism in its trade policy.66
Yet, the United States too has long pursued such a multipronged approach to
its international trade policy.67

62. Anne O. Krueger, Free Trade Agreements Versus Customs Unions (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5084), https://www.nber.org/papers/w5084.
63. TASSILO HERRSCHEL, BORDERS IN POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE: TERRITORY, SCALE, AND
SOCIETY 60 (2011).
64. Atsushi Tago, Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Unilateralism in Foreign Policy,
OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIAS (2017),
https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190228637-e-449.
65. JAMES M. ACTON ET AL., REIMAGING NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 48 (2021).
66. See Peter C.Y. Chow, Dep’t of Econs., City Coll. & Graduate Ctr., City Univ. of N.Y.,
Bilateralism vs. Trilateralism in East Asian Economic Integration: Krugman-Baldwin’s HubSpoke Thesis Revisited (2009), https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2009conference/Peter_Chow.pdf.
67. See Cooper, supra note 11, at 978.
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In the context of NAFTA, it had to be trilateral because there are only
three sovereign States on the North American continent. The pact was
designed to expand the supply chain to enjoy economies of scale. North
America was a safe place in which to operate68 and was competitive for the
global marketplace in manufacturing.69 Folding Canada with the U.S.Mexico trade relationship was a triple win. The Parties could use the
economic strength of the pact in other international institutions.70
II. TRILATERAL ATTEMPTS TO TAME THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO
BORDER
Proximity to the U.S. marketplace has long been important to the
profitability of legitimate businesses.71 For over a century and a half, to
foment trade, the Mexican government created free zones—tax-free and
duty-free environments—along the U.S.-Mexico border. In the mid-1800s,
the Mexican government officially recognized the border region as a special
duty-free area.72 By 1965, the Mexican government initiated the Border
Industrial Complex by providing tax and other incentives to factories at the
north of Mexico.73 By the 1980s, many of these maquiladoras (factories)
were owned by and did the work of major Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese
companies; these “foreign-owned plants that use cheap Mexican labor to
assemble imported materials then send the finished product back to countries

68. “The North American region has enjoyed peace for many decades and likely will
continue to do so for years to come.” Enrique Berruga-Filoy, Making the Case for Multilateral
Co-operation Between Canada and Mexico, in CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2011-2012: CANADA
AND MEXICO’S UNFINISHED AGENDA 235, 235 (Alex Bugailiskis & Andrés Rozental, eds., 2012).
69. “We need to think carefully about North America in a challenging neighborhood of the
globe. We need to reinforce the role NAFTA can play in making our businesses more
competitive.” John M. Weekes, Reinforcing North American Co-operation through NAFTA, in
CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2011-2012: CANADA AND MEXICO’S UNFINISHED AGENDA 124, 127
(Alex Bugailiskis & Andrés Rozental, eds., 2012).
70. “Eventually, without any threat to individual sovereignty, it is easy to envision a ‘North
American stance’ at future meetings of COP (Conference of Partners on Climate Change).”
Joseph M. Dukert, Energy: The Continental Bridge, in CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2011-2012:
CANADA AND MEXICO’S UNFINISHED AGENDA 160, 171 (Alex Bugailiskis & Andrés Rozental
eds., 2012).
71. “The strong presence of manufacturing on the border indicates that the proximity of firms
to a major market like the United States must also play a key role [in the geographic concentration
of industry].” JOAN B. ANDERSON & JAMES GERBER, FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE ON THE U.S.MEXICO BORDER: GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND QUALITY OF LIFE 94 (2008).
72. PAUL GANSTER & DAVID E. LOREY, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER INTO THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 32-33 (2d ed., 2008).
73. Lawrence Douglas & Taylor Hansen, The Origins of the Maquila Industry in Mexico, 53
COMERCIO EXTERIOR 1, 9 (2003); see also Anna-Stina Ericson, An Analysis of Mexico’s Border
Industrialization Program, 93 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 33, 34 (1970).
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such as the United States, paying tax only on value added by the cheap
labor.”74
After the implementation of NAFTA, U.S. and Canadian companies
continued to enjoy the benefits from importing and exporting products
through the maquiladora system in Mexico, such as the ability to avoid
paying value-added taxes, avoid some non-tariff restrictions and temporary
importation (duty-free).75 NAFTA also provided extra duty drawbacks for
importing products that contained components from other NAFTA partner
countries.76 However, Mexico went through a series of tax changes in
January 2014, which posed challenges to those who benefitted from
maquiladoras’ tax breaks.77 To placate factory owners, Mexican President
Enrique Peña Nieto granted other temporary and permanent tax benefits in
early 2014.78 Other incentives were provided at different times to
corporations under the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the Mérida
Initiative, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
It is no wonder that major corporations have long done well in Mexico
due to the country’s long history of rewarding friends of the government with

74. Debbie Nathan, Work, Sex and Danger in Ciudad Juarez, 33 NACLA REP. ON
AMERICAS, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 24.
75. Alejandro Garcia Seimandi, Maquiladora and Pitex Programs: Trying to Improve the
Obsolete, 12 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 121, 126 (2004).
76. ROBERT E. SCOTT ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER #173, REVISITING
NAFTA: STILL NOT WORKING FOR NORTH AMERICA’S WORKERS 1, 9 (2006) (“Significant and
growing shares of U.S. exports to Mexico are apparently parts and components that are assembled
into final products that are then returned to the United States.”); see NAFTA, supra note 4, art.
303.
77. See Leonie Barrie, Mexico: Tax Law Poses Challenges to Maquilas, JUST-STYLE.COM
(Jan. 31, 2014), https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%
7CA357248133&sid=sitemap&v=2.1&it=r&p=AONE&s w=w&userGroupName=anon%
7E23479809 (maquiladoras were then required to pay VAT on their imports under the Mexican
tax reform); see also New Mexican Law Poses Significant Challenges to Maquiladora Operations,
STRTRADE.COM (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.strtrade.com/news-news-New-Mexican-Tax-LawSignificant-Challenges-Maquila-Operations.html (under the tax reform, “temporary imports were
going to be subject to a 16 [%] VAT, which generally is fully creditable but only for one month
after such VAT is paid,” which typically results in the right to a tax refund); See Eugenio Grageda
Nuñez, Value Added Tax (VAT): Impacts In The Maquiladora Industry Began Jan. 1, 2015, 5
NAT'L L. REV. 27 (2015).
78. Maquiladoras could apply a tax benefit that provides an additional deduction relating to
tax-exempt employee benefits payments, taxpayers that complied with certain formalities were
given a “two-year period to fulfill a requirement of a 30% foreign ownership machinery and
equipment (M&E) used in the maquiladora operations,” and reduced income tax rates in place
from 2003 and 2013. Mexico: Presidential Decree Published Providing Tax Benefits for
Maquiladoras, PWC (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/pricingknowledge-network/tp-mexico-tax-incentives-maquiladoras.jhtml.
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protections for their respective industries79 such as removing barriers to trade
so they could be free from competition from foreign corporations.80 For
years, Mexico had been a protectionist, nationalist economy, with huge
tariffs on goods from foreign competitors.81 Mexico only joined the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 as the Uruguay Round of
negotiations commenced.82
Notwithstanding the resulting obligations to provide legal regimes for
neoliberal trade, reduce barriers to trade, and allow foreign competition,
Mexico has been described as a “captured state,”83 meaning:
[t]he Mexican state is confronted with very strong private interests
in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, cement, and others,
which the state is incapable of controlling. To a large extent, these
companies or groups force the state to define regulatory conditions
in their sectors so as to be favorable to their private interests rather
than to the public at large.84
Hence, the regulatory institutions created to control these companies
remain weak and unable to do their work or are even controlled by the
powerful corporations.85 This is known as “regulatory capture.”86 When it

79. “In the mid-1980s, barriers to imports in Mexico and Central America were greater than
anywhere else in the world, while those in South America were surpassed elsewhere only in
Africa.” REID, supra note 2, at 137.
80. See Andrew Bast, Crony Capitalism in Emerging Markets, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 16, 2010,
1:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/crony-capitalism-emerging-markets-71795; see also Eric
Martin & Brendan Case, Mexico’s President Can’t Shake Cronyism Doubts After Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0823/mexico-s-president-can-t-shake-cronyism-doubts-after-probe.
81. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34733, NAFTA AND THE MEXICAN
ECONOMY 2 (2010) (“From the 1930s through part of the 1980s, Mexico maintained a strong
protectionist trade policy in an effort to be independent of any foreign power and as a means to
industrialization.”).
82. Members and Observers, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; see also General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
83. See WORLD BANK MEXICO, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN MEXICO: BEYOND STATE
CAPTURE AND SOCIAL POLARIZATION 100-01 (2007).
84. BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2014 MEXICO COUNTRY REPORT 9 (2014),
http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Mexico.pdf.
85. Regulation is needed to overcome and minimize the negative externalities that
corporate activity produces because corporations cannot be expected to minimize their
own negative externalities. It also stands to reason that to the extent that the negative
externalities of corporate activity are global in nature, then the laws aimed at minimizing
them need to be global in nature as well.
ALICE DE JONGE, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 27 (2011).
86. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971).
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scales, there are big profits to be enjoyed. And when the corporations are
transnational in nature, it is increasingly difficult for governments and
international institutions to regulate them. Robert Lutz explained that “[t]he
transnational corporation is neither subjected to the degree of the single state
jurisdiction sufficient to control its activities, nor does its status in the
international legal system make it easily susceptible to international law.”87
Saskia Sassen described “the ascendance of this new legal regime that
negotiates between national sovereignty and the transnational practices of
corporate economic actors.”88 NAFTA was meant to usher in an era of free
trade.89 The Harvard-trained Mexican President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
was determined:
to challenge some of Mexico’s age-old ideological hang-ups. He
was somebody U.S. officials and foreign investors could talk to—in
their own language. Shrugging off a century of troubled U.S.Mexican relations—and recent economic fiascoes such as Mexico’s
1982 nationalization of the banking industry—Wall Street firms had
finally found a Mexican leader they could trust.90
Through NAFTA, legitimate trade could occur more fluidly through the
United States’ northern and southern borders, with reduced customs duties
and paperwork kept at a minimum. At the same time, illicit goods would be
interdicted.91 Peter Andreas wrote:
[By the mid-1990s] smugglers were increasingly hiding their cocaine
shipments within the rising tide of commercial trucks, railcars, and
passenger vehicles crossing the border. The boom in cross-border
traffic encouraged by the North American Free Trade Agreement
had the side effect of creating a much more challenging job for those
border agents charged with the task of weeding out illegitimate flows
from legitimate ones—a challenge that in turn provided the rationale

87. Robert E. Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View from the Developed World, 20 N.Y.U. J.
629, 633 (1988).
88. SASSEN, supra note 45, at xxvii.
89. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32718, BARRIERS TO CORPORATE FRAUD:
HOW THEY WORK, WHY THEY FAIL 32 (2004) (explaining that “‘regulatory capture’ may occur
over the course of many years, as a regulatory agency receives less and less funding to perform
the duties maintained by the law. As the regulatory body lost enforcement power, industry gains
more control over the regulatory agenda”).
90. ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, BORDERING ON CHAOS: MEXICO’S ROLLERCOASTER JOURNEY
TOWARD PROSPERITY 8 (1996).
91. Indeed, criminality increases exponentially in border regions. “Corruption may be
present wherever money is to be made from moving valuable people or things across borders.”
Richard Jones, Checkpoint Security Gateways, Airports and the Architecture of Security, in
TECHNOLOGIES OF INSECURITY: THE SURVEILLANCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 81-97 (Katja Franko
Aas et al. eds., 2009).
OF INT’L L. & POL.,
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for a further infusion of enforcement resources at official ports of
entry.92
Not surprisingly, freight forwarding, warehousing, and distribution
networks at the U.S.-Mexico border all did well in this new neoliberal
regime. Passing through U.S. Customs and Border Protection inspection and
transporting the goods across the border became paramount, especially in a
commercial world of just in time inventory management.93
The mechanisms to do this provided the legal underpinnings of the
Border Industrial Complex. 94 The corporate contracting that was designed to
fight the war on drugs affected this too, as we shall see when this Article next
examines the Mérida Initiative. Companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman all got U.S. government contracts to beef
up security with high-technology tools.95 By 2005, Boeing’s Predator-B
drone, developed for military use, was deployed at the border to interdict
illegal shipments of narcotics attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.96
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement was, above all, designed to
foment the growth of the economies of all three member countries.
Unsurprisingly, NAFTA was a boon for many corporations, particularly
large, multinational ones.97 NAFTA provided the legal foundation for the
creation of a fully integrated North American economy, allowing for free
trade,98 and reaping greater profits through comparative advantage.

92. PETER ANDREAS, KILLER HIGH: A HISTORY OF WAR IN SIX DRUGS 237 (2020).
93. See Courtenay Stevens, What is Just-In-Time (JIT) Inventory Management?, BUS. ORG.
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.business.org/finance/inventory-management/what-is-just-in-timeinventory-management/; see generally Leander Quiring, Multidisciplinary Design Optimization of
NAFTA Supply Chains (2008) (M.A. thesis, University of Waterloo),
https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/3944/thesis.pdf?sequence=1.
94. See James M. Cooper, The Rise of Private Actors at the United States-Mexico Border, 33
WISC. INT’L L.J. 104 (2015).
95. See The Top 10 Defense Contractors, BLOOMBERG GOV’T (June 10, 2021),
https://about.bgov.com/top-defense-contractors/.
96. See William Booth, More Predator Drones Fly U.S.-Mexico Border, WASH. POST (Dec.
21, 2011).
97. William Mauldin, Pacific Trade Deal Likely to Have Narrow Reach, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
15, 2015, 8:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-trans-pacific-partnership-wouldandwouldntdo-1426441618 (“Sweeping trade deals of the past—with Canada and Mexico in 1993,
for instance, or China in 2000—presented big upsides and big risks for a broad swath of U.S.
companies”).
98. See Allen Norrie, William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a
Global Perspective, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 233 (2010).
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American multinationals, with managerial and production
techniques more advanced than their European and other
competitors, both led and profited from the liberalization of
international trade—while they also operated to transfer managerial
skills and technology through the demonstration effect of their
overseas operations.99
NAFTA was designed to eliminate economic boundaries between
Mexico, Canada, and the United States. This was not a political agreement.
The territorial integrity, political independence and overall sovereignty
would remain. Nor would there be a combining of currencies, despite the
populist concerns among right-wing media pundits.100 Although this was just
a trade deal, NAFTA was important for Mexico as it joined with the United
States, long its adversary,101 at times occupier and at other times partner, to
form an economically integrated region. After the U.S. Congress ratified
NAFTA, the late Mexican poet and essayist Octavio Paz commented:
NAFTA will be important for Mexicans because it is a chance finally
for us to be modern . . . .We have failed to be modern for centuries.
We only started trying to the modern at the end of the eighteenth
century, and our conscious model of modernity has tended to be the
United States. This is the first time in the histories of our two nations
that we are going to be in some way partners with each other.102
When the United States joined its economy with those of Canada and
Mexico, it was to rival the European Union as a trade pact.103 The results, at
face value, have been good. Every day, an estimated $1.4 billion worth of
goods cross the U.S.-Mexico border.104 By 2012, NAFTA created an annual

99. Daphné Josselin & William Wallace, Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework,
in NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 6-7 (Daphné Josselin & William Wallace eds., 2001)
(citing ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE P OLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1975); S. STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1988)).
100. See Drake Bennett, The Amero Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/world/americas/25iht-25Amero.8473833.html.
101. Robert Lutz explained that “the roots of enduring problems in the United States’
relationship with Mexican can be traced in part to the legacy of legal relations emanating from
this Treaty [the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].” Robert E. Lutz, The Mexican War and the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo: What’s Best and Worst About Us, 5 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 27, 27 (1998).
102. Frank Goldman, The World After NAFTA According to Paz, NEW YORKER (Dec. 19,
1993), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/12/27/the-world-after-nafta-according-to-paz.
103. According to Richard Rosecrance, writing two years after NAFTA went into force,
“[d]eveloped states are putting aside military, political, and territorial ambitions as they struggle
not for cultural dominance but for a greater share of world output.” Richard Rosecrance, The Rise
of the Virtual State, 75 FOREIGN AFFS. 45, 45 (1996).
104. Patrick Gillispie, NAFTA: What Is It, and Why Trump Hates It, CNN (Nov. 15, 2016,
5:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/15/news/economy/trump-what-is-nafta/index.html; see
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$19 trillion regional market.105 By 2016, bilateral trade under NAFTA
expanded by 556%.106 María Belén Olmos Giupponi applauded these results:
“This trade agreement [NAFTA] represents a remarkable accomplishment
taking into consideration the differences between the two major members
states and Mexico. Contrary to what some analysts contended at the time,
NAFTA has successfully dealt with all the different challenges.”107
NAFTA facilitated trade by converging rules and reducing transaction
costs among its three Parties. Harmonization brought decreased transaction
costs, less delays, and a more integrated North American supply chain. Soon
after NAFTA went into effect, Mexico’s trade increased 17.5% with the
United States and 33.3% with Canada.108 Additionally, exports, imports, and
foreign investment increased in the country.109 Mexican President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari negotiated NAFTA and trumpeted his administration’s
neoliberal policies to foment development in Mexico.110 Salinas’ successor,
President Vicente Fox, also considered NAFTA as a success while he was in
office from 2000 to 2006.111 So did Presidents Felipe Calderón112 and Enrique
Pena-Nieto.113 Nobel laureate Paul Krugman noted:
[i]n the case of Mexico, it is natural to suppose that NAFTA has
played an important role, although much of the growth in Mexican

Carla A. Hills, NAFTA’s Economic Upsides: The View from the United States, 93 FOREIGN AFFS.
122 (2014).
105. Hills, supra note 104, at 122.
106. Sergio M. Alcocer, Managing the Mexico-U.S. Border: Working for a More Integrated
and Competitive North America, in THE ANATOMY OF A RELATIONSHIP: A COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS ON THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.-MEXICO COOPERATION ON BORDER MANAGEMENT 19
(Christopher Wilson ed., 2016).
107. OLMOS GIUPPONI, supra note 8, at 125.
108. Chris Olive, Member States Development: Mexico, 1 NAFTA LAW & BUS. REV. AM.
122 (1995).
109. Id.
110. Laura Carlsen, Armoring NAFTA: The Battleground for Mexico’s Future, 41 NACLA
REP. ON AMERICAS 17 (2008).
111. Carlos Salas, Mexico’s Haves and Have-Nots: NAFTA Sharpens the Divide, 35 NACLA
REP. ON AMERICAS 32, 33 (2002); see also EDUARDO BOLIO ET AL., A TALE OF TWO MEXICOS:
GROWTH AND PROSPERITY IN A TWO-SPEED ECON. (2014).
112. Remarks Following a Meeting with President of Mexico Felipe de Jesus Calderon
Hinojosa, 2008 PUB. PAPERS 1565 (Jan. 13, 2009); see also Michael Abramowitz, White House
Defends NAFTA As Bush Meets with Heads of Mexico, Canada, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2008, at
A03.
113. The President’s News Conf. With President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico and Prime
Minister Stephen J. Harper of Canada in Toluca, Mexico, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1 (Feb 19,
2014); Patricia Rey Mallén, 20 Years of NAFTA: Enrique Peña Nieto, Barack Obama and
Stephen Harper Talk the Economic Future of North America, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014,
6:25 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/20-years-nafta-enrique-pena-nieto-barack-obama-stephenharper-talk-economic-future-north-america.

2022]

BIZARRE LOVE TRIANGLE

19

exports may also reflect two other factors: the delayed effects of
Mexico’s dramatic unilateral liberalization of trade between 1985
and 1988, and the weak peso that followed the 1994-95 financial
crisis.114
As they sought political support to pass legislation to enable the trade
pacts rules within the laws of the United States, the U.S. political leaders
billed NAFTA as the future for prosperity, not only in the United States, but
eventually all over the Americas.115 “NAFTA was promoted by presidents
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton as something that would buoy up the
Mexican economy and reduce or end illegal immigration—two claims that
now are clearly refuted by facts.”116
Labor rights and environmental protection were not part of NAFTA’s
main agreement; they were left as a side agreement (with no real meaningful
enforcement mechanisms), a contribution by newly elected U.S. President
Bill Clinton to the North American Free Trade Agreement, which had been
negotiated by his predecessor.117 The side agreements, the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation118 and the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation,119 were paper tigers, allowing for citizen
submissions without any real ability to collect damages or change
governmental or corporate behavior. As a result, non-governmental
organizations, labor activists, and environmental advocates could not hold
the NAFTA Parties accountable for failing to live up to their respective treaty
commitments, within both the NAFTA framework and in international law.
During the 1992 Presidential election, then Arkansas Governor, Bill
Clinton made it a great deal that NAFTA should not hurt labor rights.120 This
appealed to the trade unions in the U.S., which at the time, were rightfully
scared of what would happen if lower cost labor was available and there were
114. Paul R. Krugman, Trade and Wages, Reconsidered, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 103, 111 (2008).
115. Matthew Rooney, What’s Next: Making NAFTA into a Tool for National Prosperity,
GEORGE. W. BUSH INST. (2017).
116. Charles Bowden, Chuck Bowden’s Border War, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.4/the-war-next-door.
117. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, The North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation: A New Frontier in North American Labor Relations, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 533
(1995); see also Sarah Richardson, Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment—The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183 (1998).
118. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
119. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
120. President Clinton had risked the wrath of the Democratic Party’s trade union base by
endorsing NAFTA, working closely with Republicans to help push the controversial trade pact
through Congress in 1993 despite opposition from a majority of Democrats. EDWARD ALDEN,
THE CLOSING THE AMERICAN BORDER: TERRORISM, IMMIGRATION AND S ECURITY SINCE 9/11,
50 (2008).
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no tariffs on the trade of these goods. While President Clinton said the trade
pact would create one million jobs in the United States in its first five years,121
economists warned that NAFTA threatened U.S. jobs.122
With membership in the trade pact, Mexico opened its traditionally
protected industries, lowering trade tariffs between the three participatory
countries and providing much needed confidence to foreign capital to invest
in Mexico.123 With the liberalization of government procurement, U.S. and
Canadian corporations were finally allowed to bid on Mexico’s public works
projects, profit from their capital markets, and invest without limitation. (and
Mexican companies could do the same in Canada and the United States).
NAFTA has brought increased benefits among some corporations.124
Large firms benefited more than small and medium-size ones, a result that
seems related to the unavailability of domestic credit after the financial crisis
of 1995 (large firms were able to increase their access to international
financial markets, but this option was not available for smaller ones),
indicating the needs to strengthen efforts in deepening domestic financial
markets to reach underserved sectors. This has been a boon for multinational
corporations and their shareholders. Ricardo Grinspun and Robert
Kreklewich note:
the regime on intellectual property rights to show that large
corporations have imposed a set of rules that serve their interests
rather than the public’s. The rules limit the free flow of information,

121. Glenn Kessler, The Strange Tale About why Bill Clinton Said NAFTA Would Create 1
Million Jobs, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/21/strange-tale-about-why-bill-clinton-saidnafta-would-create-million-jobs/; Economic Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented Under
Trade Auth. Procedures, Inv. No. 332-555, USITC Pub. 4614 (June 2016).
122. Robert E. Scott, The High Price of ‘Free’ Trade, ECON. POL’Y INST., 1 (Nov. 17, 2003)
(“Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1993, the rise in the
U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico through 2002 has caused the displacement of
production that supported 879,280 U.S. jobs.”).
123. Roberto Rosas, Trademarks under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
With References to the Current Mexican Law, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 167, 173 (2014).
124. While conceding that many U.S. high-wage manufacturing jobs were relocated to
Mexico, China and other foreign locations as a result of NAFTA, Cohen argues that
NAFTA has, on balance, been a good thing for the U.S. economy and U.S. corporations.
“The sucking sound that Ross Perot predicted did not occur; many jobs were created in
Canada and Mexico, and [the resulting] economic activity N/A created a somewhat
seamless supply chain—a North American supply chain that allowed North American
auto companies to be more profitable and more competitive."
Knowledge@Wharton, Public Policy: NAFTA, 20 Years Later: Do the Benefits Outweigh the
Costs?, WHARTON/UNIV. OF PENN. (Feb. 19, 2014),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/nafta-20-years-later-benefits-outweigh-costs/.
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technology, and trademarks to the detriment, in their view, of poor
people and countries.125
Size can matter. Joan B. Anderson and James Gerber explained that
“[l]arge firms usually have greater access to capital and to the legal and
administrative resources they need to navigate the legal system and the
bureaucracy.”126 The reduction of bureaucracy at the border between the
United States and Mexico better aligned the two countries’ commerce.127 By
using U.S. technology, millions of goods could be produced by less
expensive labor in Mexico for export to and consumption in the United
States.128 All of the North American continent would become part of the same
supply chain, enjoying just in time production and the comparative advantage
that comes with such liberalized trade regime.129 Duty drawbacks allow for a
fully integrated supply chain in the three partner countries and a truly
regionally integrated inventory management, just in time, system.130 The
trade pact increased trade through tariff reduction and the integration of the
production process.131 The rules and procedures were to be harmonized to
align with those from the United States. Ronald Wolf has suggested that the
globalization of law has met the primacy of international business law and
American approaches to business law.132
Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in the rise of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement provisions in the free trade treaties which the United
States has entered. NAFTA facilitated foreign direct investment (FDI) and
institutionalized rules regime with meaningful enforcement mechanisms—
125. ROBERT A. PASTOR, TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE
OLD WORLD FOR THE NEW 12 (2001).
126. ANDERSON & GERBER, supra note 71, at 101.
127. “NAFTA was a brave new world for the three governments.” David A. Gantz, The
Evolution of U.S. Views on FTA Investment Protection: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile
Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 679, 685 (2004).
128. ANDERSON & GERBER, supra note 71, at 89-90.
129. See Macleans Mzumara, et al., An Analysis of Comparative Advantage and Intra-North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Trade Performance, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 103, 110
(2012).
130. “[G]oods produced in Mexico for export to the United States typically contain about 40%
U.S. content (25% from Canada).” GANTZ, supra note 30, at 126 (citing Pia Orrenius, Economic
Outlook Deteriorates Due to COVID-19: Short and Long Run Implications for North American
Supply Chains, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS (May 13, 2020),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/00d93381/orrenius-baker-inst.pdf).
131. See generally David A. Gantz, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Overview
and Analysis, BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT (2018),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/1f9f406a/bi-report-121118-mex-usmca.pdf
132. See generally RONALD CHARLES WOLF, TRADE, AID AND ARBITRATE: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF WESTERN LAW (2004) (maintaining that the philosophies of present
international institutional organizations, coupled with the fundamentals of international
arbitration, has weakened national sovereignty over international trade issues).
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independent, binding, and neutral arbitral panels comprised of trade experts
from the pact’s Parties to deal with disputes. Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides
for an Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism to adjudicate
cases of takings, expropriation, and nationalization investments. This is the
venue for deciding what is fair, just, and equitable compensation.133 “NAFTA
was a particular tipping point” for Haley Sweetland Edwards.
It marked the first time ever that an international treaty between two
close investment partners—two of them well-developed, complex
democracies—included all the provisions of a BIT as well as ISDS.
The move not only allowed American and Canadian investors to
challenge Mexico outside of its shaky judicial system, but it also
allowed investors from all three signatory countries to challenge the
U.S. and Canada outside of their robust and reliable courts. That was
unprecedented—a watershed in the history of investors’ rights.134
This area of law by its very nature brings to bear a long history of private
actor involvement.
Lex mercatoria is an area that is marked in particular by private
actors that are creating the ‘rules of the game’ as well as—in the form
of arbitration tribunals—by the institutional framework for the
administration of these rules.135
It is indeed a rarified world that is created by free trade agreements and
other forms of harmonization—the very policy prescriptions of the
Washington Consensus.
International trade law continues to concentrate wealth in artificial
corporations that exist without territorial borders. This is deliberately
encouraged by nation-states. International trade law and especially
the arbitral systems that enforce international investment agreements
have created a commercial empire that operates similar to
colonialism and imperialism.136

133. Manuel Pérez-Rocha, Free Trade’s Chilling Effects, 48 NACLA REP. ON AMERICAS 223
(2016), https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2016.1228169. Cf. Simon Lester, The ISDS
Controversy: How We Got Here and Where Next, CATO INST. (July 1, 2016),
https://www.cato.org/commentary/isds-controversy-how-we-got-here-where-next.
134. HALEY SWEETLAND EDWARDS, SHADOW COURTS: THE TRIBUNALS THAT RULE
GLOBAL TRADE 45 (2016).
135. GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 31 (2010).
136. James (Sa’kej) Youngblood Henderson, Foreword to INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BUILDING EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS xvi (John Borrows & Risa Schwartz, eds, 2020). Cf. Karen J. Alter,
From Colonial to Multilateral International Law: A Global Capitalism and Law Investigation, 19
INT’L J. CONST. L. 798, abstract, (2021) (“[T]he shift from European colonial domination to a
law-based multilateralism, [has] enabled a more equal and inclusive international law.”).
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NAFTA was not like the U.S.-Canada FTA—an agreement between
both developed, Anglo-Saxon, common law, capitalist, and advanced
countries. Mexico remains a civil law country.137 The Parties wanted
investment disputes to be arbitrated by outside experts, not Mexican judiciary
members who may be open to corruption or influence.138
These investor-state dispute provisions were indeed the most
controversial part of NAFTA.
[Chapter 11] establishes a mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among
investors of the Parties to the Agreement in accordance with the
principle of international reciprocity and due process before an
impartial tribunal.139
A NAFTA investor, an individual or corporation that is a non-state
actors rather than one of the signatory countries, who alleges that a host
government has breached its investment obligations under Chapter 11, may
choose one of three arbitral mechanisms: the World Bank’s International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), ICSID’s
Additional Facility Rules, or the rules of the United Nations Commission for
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules).140 Alternatively, the investor
may choose the remedies available in the host country’s domestic courts.141
An important feature of the Chapter 11 arbitral provisions is the
enforceability in domestic courts of final awards by arbitration tribunals.142
This mechanism has been very costly and thus only accessible to the
largest of corporations. Some critics have called these provisions from
Chapter 11, “corporate welfare,” as they create a series of nuisance lawsuits
to force foreign governments to capitulate for fear of incurring hundreds of
millions of dollars of potential monetary damages and expensive legal
fees.143 The long-standing doctrine of sovereign immunity has been turned
137. Although the NAFTA is one of an increasing number of efforts to harmonize, merge,
and even unify international trade law involving different legal systems, the
comprehensive efforts to do so between the United States and Mexico under the cloak
of NAFTA face stark contrasts between the traditions of the civil law and common law
systems.
Lutz, supra note 33, at 394-95.
138. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2020) (indicating that
Mexico ranked 124/180 and scored 31/100); see also LATINOBAROMETRO, INFORME 2021 (2021).
139. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1115.
140. Id. art. 1120.
141. Id. art. 1135(2)(c).
142. Id. art. 1136(4).
143. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING
DEMOCRACY 1 (Sept. 2001); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999) (a Virginia-based
corporation, developed a gasoline additive known as methylcyclopentadienyl manganese
tricarbonyl (MMT) and then exported it Canada). Id. at 710. After scientific studies brought light
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on its head, as foreign investors sue sovereign states before independent and
binding tribunals.144 While the claim for the $970 million in damages that
the Canadian company Methanex made against the United States was
dismissed in full in August 2005, Methanex v. United States showed how
investors could stop environmental regulations. Keystone XL lawsuit is
another example of corporations claiming outrageous damages in Chapter 11
proceedings.145
And while Chapter 11 has been a boon for some corporations and their
inventors,146 NAFTA did very little for labor for environmental protections.
These issues were relegated to “side agreements” that had no real,
meaningful enforcement procedures, nor sanctions.147 One report concluded,
that “[r]ather than triggering a convergence across the three nations, NAFTA
has accentuated the economic and regulatory asymmetries that had existed
among the three countries.”148
While Mexico experienced economic growth, several sectors within the
country experienced a decline.149 Critics have pointed out that real income

to the public health risks posed by MMT, in 1997 the Canadian Parliament banned MMT. Id. In
response, Ethyl filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state claim against Canada and further argued
that the ban was a violation of Article 1102 and 1106. Id. at 711. After a NAFTA panel overruled
Canada’s objection to the suit claiming that MMT was not a measure covered under Chapter 11,
Canada settled the claim, resulting in Canada’s reversal of the MMT ban and paid $13 million to
Ethyl for legal fees and damages. Id. at 731. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal
ordered Canada to pay investors $120,200. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, para. 18 UNCITRAL
(NAFTA), Final Award, Award in Respect of Costs (Nov. 26, 2002). In S.D. Meyers, Inc. v.
Canada, the Tribunal ordered Canada to pay a total amount of $850,000 to S.D. Meyers, Inc. with
respect to arbitration fees and legal representation. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, paras. 53-54
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award (Dec. 30, 2002).
144. Since time immemorial people have travelled abroad to invest and to engage in
business. When European traders began to sail to Asia, Africa, and Latin America
to trade with the people in local communities, it was held that the local law could not
be applied to traders since they were already subject to the law of their respective
home countries.
Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 727, 728 (Malcolm D.
Evans, ed., 4th ed., 2014).
145. Tracy Johnson & Kyle Bakx, Transcanada an Underdog, but has Strong Case Against
Washington, CBC (Jan. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM) https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/transcanada-kxlkeystone-nafta-lawsuit-damages-pipeline-1.3392720; see also Cory Adkins & David
Grewal, Democracy and Legitimacy in Investor-State Arbitration, 126 YALE L.J.F. 65
(2016).
146. OLMOS GIUPPONI, supra note 8, at 130.
147. Cooper, supra note 57, at 50.
148. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 3.
149. MARK WEISBROT ET AL., DID NAFTA HELP MEXICO? AN UPDATE AFTER 23 YEARS,
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC & POLICY RESEARCH (March 2017) (arguing that “Mexico did not do
as well as the region as a whole, averaging 1 percent in per capita GDP growth for those years.”
Additionally, Mexico’s national poverty rate was 55.1% in 2014 compared to 52.4% in 1994
when NAFTA was enacted).

2022]

BIZARRE LOVE TRIANGLE

25

per capita, real wages, and income poverty have not improved much since
NAFTA was signed. Indeed, NAFTA was designed to provide jobs for
workers in Mexico.150 Mexicans required a reason to stay in Mexico instead
of emigrating to the United States. But the data demonstrates that the boom
in Mexican jobs was not long-term.151 In the border factories that are owned
by Mexicans in addition to Koreans, Taiwanese, and Chinese nationals, low
skilled wages all supply the U.S. marketplace. However, this drew
populations from southern Mexico towards the northern border in cities like
Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez.152
Labor conditions seldom improved where there are jobs forcing
migrants to other countries to seek work. Saskia Sassen reflects on “the
particular content of this new regime, which strengthens the advantage of
certain types of economic actors and weakens those of others.”153 In the latter
category, with the commodification of Mexican and Central American
migrants placed into incarceration, there has also been a commodification of
labor in the North American marketplace. The architects of NAFTA even
claimed that it would resolve the post-Cold War identity crisis of the United
States.154 Lower-skilled wages would flow to Mexico, as the low cost of labor
in Mexico would become a comparative advantage for that country.155
Additionally, as mentioned before, NAFTA relegated labor issues and
environmental issues to side agreements, out of range of the NAFTA dispute
resolution mechanisms and left the goals in those areas unenforceable and

150. See Lori Wallach, NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality,
HUFF. POST (Jan. 6, 2014, 3:19 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nafta-at-20-one-millionu_b_4550207; see also Andrew Chatzky et al., NAFTA and the USMCA: Weighing the Impact of
North American Trade, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftaseconomic-impact (last updated July 1, 2020).
151. In Mexico, real wages have fallen sharply and there has been a steep decline in the
number of people holding regular jobs in paid positions. Many workers have been shifted
into subsistence-level work in the “informal sector,” frequently unpaid work in family
retail trade or restaurant businesses. Additionally, a flood of subsidized, low-priced corn
from the United States has decimated farmers and rural economics.
Scott, supra note 122, at 10.
152. “One consequence of such rapid growth, however, is that, beginning in the late 1980s,
the existing labor force in many Mexican border communities became inadequate to fill the
available positions . . . Workers migrate from the interior of the country because jobs are
relatively plentiful . . . .” ANDERSON & GERBER, supra note 71, at 93, 95.
153. SASSEN, supra note 45 at xxvii.
154. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The NAFTA: Its Overarching Implications, 27 INT’L
LAW 589, 601 (1993).
155. Joan B. Anderson & James Gerber explain “Mexico’s comparative advantage due to the
availability of low-wage, unskilled or semi-skilled labor” and “the situation of low wages with
relatively high levels of productivity.” ANDERSON & GERBER, supra note 71, at 94.
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aspirational.156 This has provided for a devaluation of labor as an abundant,
cheap, and unprotected commodity.157 Lynn Stephen wrote:
Americans face a dilemma. While in our post-9/11 culture many are
calling for stricter border controls and ever more stringent
immigration legislation to prevent the entrance of terrorists to the
United States, we have a good economy that is highly dependent on
recent immigrant labor—much of it Mexican and much of it
undocumented.158
Migrant workers, who by definition have fewer freedoms, are often more
vulnerable than the laborers legally permitted to work earning average
wages.159 Too often, immigrants who work in low skilled jobs are seen “as
an expendable resource, a resource whose social protection and continued
reproduction is of little or no concern.”160 Migrant workers have become
more vulnerable after NAFTA, which has increased the free flow of trade
between the participatory countries.161 For Ronald Wolf, economic
liberalism has pushed a new world commercial legal order which has also
affected civil rights.162 Labor laws (like environmental laws) are relegated to
side agreements, out of range of the dispute resolution mechanisms for which
the main guts of NAFTA provided. 163 The extremely low wages and long
hours at maquiladoras “fosters the sense that workers are cheap, disposable
commodities.”164 Labor falls into the markets as if it were mainly a
commodity, “subordinating the social to the ‘laws of the market.’”165 Labor

156. See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: Guestworkers, International Trade, and the
Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 29 (2006).
157. Access to cheaper inputs is, therefore, just as important as access to widening
markets in keeping profitable opportunities open. The implication is that noncapitalist territories should be forced open not only to trade (which could be helpful)
but also to permit capital to invest in profitable ventures using cheaper labour power,
raw materials, low-cost land, and the like. The general thrust of any capitalist logic of
power is not that territories should be held back from capitalist development, but that
they should be continuously opened up.
HARVEY, supra note 20, at 139.
158. LYNN STEPHEN, TRANSBORDER LIVES: INDIGENOUS OAXACANS IN MEXICO,
CALIFORNIA, AND OREGON 143 (2007).
159. Stuart Rosewarne, Globalization and the Commodities of Labour: Temporary Labour
Migrants, 20 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 99, 107 (2010)
160. Id. at 105.
161. Jeff Faux, How NAFTA Failed Mexico, 14 AM. PROSPECT 35 (2003); Garcia, supra note
156, at 33.
162. RONALD CHARLES WOLF, TRADE, AID AND ARBITRATE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
WESTERN LAW (2003).
163. Garcia, supra note 156, at 29.
164. Nathan, supra note 74.
165. Rosewarne, supra note 159, at 104.
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is increasingly being commoditized in global markets, where international
corporations are free to roam the world and hire the most vulnerable
workers.166
The colonial premises of international trade law have remained
resilient, taking their sources and authorities from the colonial
archive. This commercial empire promulgates a lie: that humanity
reaps the benefits of a more meaningful life when nations specialize
in developing natural resource and labour within their territory,
based on comparative advantages, through a combination of national
politics and private enterprise.167
Some studies have shown that free trade has also exacerbated income
inequality in the United States.168 A report from Boston University concluded
that “NAFTA has fallen short of achieving many of its own objectives.
Rather than promoting convergence of incomes, wages, and standards,
NAFTA has tended to accentuate pre-existing economic and regulatory
asymmetries in North America.”169 Since 1994, NAFTA has benefited the
rich,170 harmed the poor by displacing Mexican workers,171 devastated local
communities with maquiladora factories, and decreased wages for the
working class.172 “In Mexico, NAFTA is blamed for creating few new jobs
while decimating many existing sources of livelihood, particularly in
agriculture.”173 In addition to a dearth in jobs, the basic ability to grow one’s
own food was seriously diminished as agribusiness entered the market and
began accumulating productive land, with better yields through
166. Garcia, supra note 156, at 28.
167. Henderson, supra note 136, at xvi.
168. Lori Wallach & Melanie Foley, Studies Reveal Consensus: Trade Flows during “Free
Trade” Era Have Exacerbated U.S. Income Inequality, PUB. CITIZEN’s GLOB. TRADE WATCH
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2014/01/studies-reveal-consensus-tradeflows-during-free-trade-era-have-exacerbated-us-income-inequality.html.
169. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 2.
170. See generally Carrie Kahn, How NAFTA Helped the Mexican Billionaires’ Club, NPR
(Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/01/258668414/how-nafta-helped-the-mexicanbillionaires-club.
171. Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 124 (“[W]orkers in Mexico have not seen wage
growth. Job losses and wage stagnation are NAFTA’s real legacy.”) (citing Robert Scott, Chief
Economist at the Economic Policy Institute).
172. Faux, supra note 161, at 36; see also Christopher Wilson, Working Together: Economic
Ties Between The United States And Mexico, WILSON CENTER (2011),
http://wilsoncenter.org/publication/working-together-economic-ties-between-the-united-statesand-mexico; Dustin Ensinger, NAFTA Job Losses Continue to Mount, ECONOMY IN CRISIS (May
3, 2011), http://economyincrisis.org/content/nafta-jobs-losses-continue-mount; Yves Smith,
NAFTA Successfully Undermined Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/24/what-weve-learned-from-nafta/naftasuccessfully-undermined-regulations.
173. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 3.
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mechanization.174 Likewise, with the advent of genetically modified corn,
tortillas became cheaper than the real thing made locally.175
The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed not just the United States,
but also Mexico.176 For a year and a half prior to the terror attacks, Mexican
President Vicente Fox developed a relationship with U.S. President George
W. Bush to regularize the millions of Mexicans living without legal status
(an initiative termed “the Whole Enchilada”).177 The two knew each other as
governors, had visited each other’s ranches, and were both businessmen in
their previous professional lives. Prior to the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon, the Fox administration had made some headway
in lobbying for comprehensive immigration reform. The 9/11 attacks
changed the United States to focus on border security. Robert Pastor
explained:
If NAFTA had created institutions and a new relationship among the
three governments, then the day after 9/11, the Mexican President
and the Canadian prime minister would have joined President Bush
to announce that the attack was against all three countries, and they
would respond together. This did not happen, and indeed, 9/11
contributed to an escalation of fears and a downturn in trade and
commerce.178
Corporations could make profits that emerged in the War on Terror after
the 9/11 attacks. The Border Industrial Complex was just getting started.

174. See generally Flavia Echanove, Agribusiness and Farmers in Mexico: The Importance of
Contractual Relations, 171 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 166,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227710386_Agribusiness_and_farmers_in_Mexico_The
_importance_of_contractual_relations. Keith Sealing, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Farmers:
NAFTA's Threat to Mexican Teosinte Farmers and What Can be Done About It, 18 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1383 (2003),
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1204&context=auilr.
175. See Andrew Pollack, Kraft Recalls Taco Shells with Bioengineered Corn, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/23/business/kraft-recalls-taco-shells-withbioengineered-corn.html; Renee Alexander and Simran Sethi, Mexico Is Phasing out Imports of
Glyphosate and GMO Corn. Supporters Say That Could Reverse Years of Damage from U.S.
Trade Policy, THE COUNTER (July 19, 2021), https://thecounter.org/mexico-phaseout-glyphosategenetically-engineered-corn-united-states/ (“The pact (NAFTA) devastated rural economies in
Mexico, flooding the market with cheap, government-subsidized U.S. corn and gutting domestic
corn prices by nearly 70 percent. This shift led an estimated 2 million farmworkers to abandon the
countryside to seek work in big cities or across the border in the United States”).
176. ALDEN, supra note 120, at 261.
177. Duncan Campbell, Mexico Goes for the Whole Enchilada, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2001,
11:52 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/05/immigration.usa.
178. PASTOR, supra note 52, at 28.
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B. The Security and Prosperity Partnership
There was a proliferation of security initiatives among the NAFTA
countries, as the United States sought to further lockdown its borders and
more diligently regulate its trade with its trading partners after the September
11, 2001 attacks. The Security and Property Partnership was the culmination
of these security initiatives and common defense policies.179 “In a post-9/11
world, it also aimed to make the United States’ ‘war on terror’ into a regional
security issue.”180 This was the era of the Container Security Initiative181 and
other programs of Department of Homeland Security to harmonize the
customs process, increase the rigor of inspection processes, and transfer some
of the inspection operations offshore to foreign ports.182
Building on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Security
and Property Partnership (SPP),183 agreed to by Canadian Prime Minister
Paul Martin, Mexican President Vicente Fox, and U.S. President George W.
Bush in March 2005, was a culmination of security initiatives and common
defense policies. But it was not a treaty with legal obligations.184 There was
no actual agreement, nor any binding obligations to supplement NAFTA. By
the time the three government leaders met in March 2006 at the second
summit of the SPP in Cancun, Mexico, they turned to corporate leaders and
trade associations to work together to create a more integrated trade area.185
The North American Competitiveness Council, with thirty corporate
representatives from some of North America’s largest corporations, which
reported to the executive branches in the three NAFTA partner countries, and
were directed to improve trade and commerce by liberalizing rules of origin,
exchanging information on health and safety, and harmonizing the use of
symbols on textiles and apparel. The SPP wanted to do business more
179. See North American Leaders Show Unity, BBC (Mar. 23, 2005, 5:42 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4376431.stm.
180. Stephen Zamora, Rethinking North America: Why NAFTA’s Laissez Faire Approach to
Integration Is Flawed, and What to Do About It, 56 VILL. L. REV. 631, 642 (2011).
181. See CSI: Container Security Initiative, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief (last modified on
May 31, 2019).
182. For other security initiatives post-9/11 among the three NAFTA Parties, see Border
Security, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security (last
modified on Jan. 4, 2022).
183. Joint Statement by President Bush, President Fox, and Prime Minister Martin, Security
and Prosperity Partnership of North America, (Mar. 23, 2005), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-2.html.
184. See North American Leaders Show Unity, supra note 179.
185. See generally Katherine Sciacchitano, From NAFTA to the SPP: Here Comes the
Security and Prosperity Partnership, But-What Security? Whose Prosperity?, DOLLARS & SENSE
(2008), http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2008/0108sciacchitano.html
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efficiently, competing with other trade blocs, and benefiting from the
comparative advantage186 But without a multilateral treaty and a budget, not
much came to pass in the end, and all talk of these initiatives came to a quiet
end.187
It can, at best, be characterized as an endeavor by the three countries
to facilitate communication and cooperation across several key
policy areas of mutual interest. Although the SPP builds upon the
existing trade and economic relationship of the three countries, it is
not a trade agreement and is distinct from the existing North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some key issues for
Congress regarding the SPP concern possible implications related to
private sector priorities, national sovereignty, transportation
corridors, cargo security, and border security.188
Regional economic integration can provide some serious security
challenges. There were unproven rumors that Al Qaeda and other terrorists
could cross the U.S.-Mexico border,189 that the narcotraficantes and other
transnational criminal organizations were joining forces with Islamic
extremist groups, and that Central American maras190 were using beheadings
186. See generally Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the
(Partially) Disaggregated State: Lessons from the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 479, 484-92 (2008).
187. While the spp.gov website has been taken down, there are still archived materials
available online, primarily those posted by the Canadian government. See generally Evaluation of
the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) Pilot Project on Reducing
Emissions from Vehicles and Engines (PPRE), GOV’T CANADA (July 2011) [hereinafter
Evaluation of the SPP], https://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ae-ve/2011-2012/1405/ec-com1405-en-s2.htm.
188. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & JENNIFER E. LAKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22701,
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW AND SELECTED
ISSUES (2009).
189. See Ellen Weiss, Opinion: Drug Cartels Across the Border Are Just As Brutal As ISIS,
ABC 10 NEWS SAN DIEGO (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.10news.com/decodedc/drug-cartelsacross-the-border-just-as-brutal-as-isis. Cf. John Parkinson, DHS Rebuffs Congressman’s Claim
ISIS Infiltrating Southern Border, ABC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:39 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dhs-rebuffs-congressmans-claim-isis-infiltrating-southernborder/story?id=26043280. This myth has been propagated for years:
In December 2005, the Department of Homeland Security sent word that authorities
had arrested dozens of terrorist operatives who were already inside the country. While
the total number of suspects was unknown, officials reported at least fifty-one people
from countries known to support terrorist activities or harbor terrorist sympathies—
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria—had been intercepted by the Border
Patrol and other members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) since the unit
began tracking such arrests a little more than a year before.
TOM TANCREDO, IN MORTAL DANGER: THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S BORDER AND SECURITY
86 (2006).
190. Maras are the plural for the members of Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, a transnational
drug trafficking organization. See generally, ALBERT DEAMICIS, OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS,
MARA SALVATRUCHA: THE DEADLIEST STREET GANG IN AMERICA, NCJ NO. 251138 (2017),
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and other public displays of violence similar to those employed by extremists
in the Middle East. 191 The SPP was aimed to counter threats posed directly
by international terrorists. Thomas Shannon, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, provided that “[t]o a certain extent,
we’re armoring NAFTA.”192
Some politicians viewed the SPP as a threat to the sovereignty of the
United States. In the second session of the 109th Congress of the United
States on September 28, 2006, Representatives Virgil Goode Jr., Ron Paul,
Walter Jones, and Tom Tancredo submitted a resolution to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure that made some noise, but no resolution or
law emerged.193
In Canada, National Chairperson of the Council of Canadians, described
it as anti-democratic and a threat to Canada’s water and energy.194 Critics
took to the media to lambaste the SPP and corporate control. For then-CNN
anchor Lou Dobbs, the SPP was the gateway to a new common currency.195
Stephen Zamora used a more academic term by referring to the SPP as an
example of “NAFTA-related ‘quasi-supranationalism.’”196

https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/mara-salvatrucha-deadliest-street-gangamerica.
191. Cf. CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RSCH, SERV., RL34233, THE MS-13 AND 18TH STREET
GANGS: EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS? 1 (2010) (“[P]erhaps most disturbingly
for policy makers in a post- 9/11 world, alarms have been sounded in some circles that
international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda could exploit alien and narcotics smuggling
networks controlled by these gangs to infiltrate the United States. To date, however, no evidence
suggests that these gangs and international terrorist groups are cooperating with one another.”);
Joseph Rogers, Gangs and Terrorists in the Americas: An Unlikely Nexus, 14 J. GANG RES. 19
(2007).
192. Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., Asst. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dept. of State, Remarks at a AS/COA
Hosted Conversation (Apr. 2, 2008), https://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-asst-secretary-statewestern-hemisphere-affairs-thomas-shannon.
193. H.Con.Res. 40 (110th): Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should
Not Engage in the Construction of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Superhighway System or Enter into a North American Union with Mexico and Canada,
GOVTRACK (Jan. 22, 2007), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hconres40; H.R. Con.
Res. 40, 110th Cong. (2007).
194. Brent Patterson, Maude Barlow Addresses ‘Peace with Water’ Conference, COUNCIL OF
CANADIANS, https://canadians.org/analysis/maude-barlow-addresses-peace-water-conference (last
visited Feb. 21, 2022).
195. Lou Dobbs Tonight, CNN (June 21, 2006),
https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ldt/date/2006-06-21/segment/01 (“The Bush administration’s
open-borders policy and its decision to ignore the enforcement of this country’s immigration laws
is part of a broader agenda. President Bush signed a formal agreement that will end the United
States as we know it, and he took the step without approval from either the U.S. Congress or the
people of the United States.”).
196. Zamora, supra note 180, at 642.
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According to a United States Congressional Research Service report
on the SPP:
The primary purpose of the initiative was to improve cooperative
efforts among the three countries in areas related to economic
prosperity and the protection of the environment, the food supply,
and public health. The initial plan included the establishment of a
number of security and prosperity working groups in each of the two
categories. [For the U.S. government,] [t]he security working groups
were chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
prosperity working groups were chaired by the Secretary of
Commerce.197
While the spp.gov website has been taken down, archived materials are
still available online, they are posted primarily by the Canadian
government.198 According to the Canadian government website, the SPP was
about more than just a common defense policy:
The SPP . . . provides a flexible means for a dialogue, priority setting,
collaboration and action on issues affecting the security, prosperity
and quality of life of Canadians, Americans and Mexicans. It
addresses diverse issues, such as border facilitation, the
environment, food and product safety, and includes measures to
improve overall North American competitiveness.199
It is of little surprise that the SPP scared a great many economic
nationalists, union leaders, conspiracy theorists, and media pundits. Critics
painted the SPP as the blueprint for a takeover by the corporations.200 Elected
representatives in the United States saw the lack of democratic oversight as
troublesome. A congressional research report noted, “[s]ome key issues for
Congress regarding the SPP concern possible implications related to private
sector priorities, national sovereignty, transportation corridors, cargo
security, and border security.”201
Not much happened. Various representatives from Canada, Mexico, and
the United States met in February 2007 to discuss the Security and Prosperity
Partnership. When they later met at Montebello, Quebec in August 2007, the
197. VILLARREAL & LAKE, supra note 188, at 1.
198. See Evaluation of the SPP, supra note 187.
199. Id.
200. Lou Dobbs opined that the SPP was the gateway to a new common currency. See also
Lou Dobbs Tonight, supra note 195 (“The Bush administration’s open-borders policy and its
decision to ignore the enforcement of this country’s immigration laws is part of a broader agenda.
President Bush signed a formal agreement that will end the United States as we know it, and he
took the step without approval from either the U.S. Congress or the people of the United States.”).
Zamora, supra note 180, at 642 (Professor Stephen Zamora gave the SPP a bit more academic
respectability by referring to it as an example of “NAFTA-related ‘quasi-supranationalism’”).
201. VILLARREAL & LAKE, supra note 188 (emphasis added).
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leaders of the three countries even referred to the SPP discussions as
“NAFTA trade talks.”202 Eventually, the blogosphere nationalist groups
particularly in Canada and the United States, made enough noise to have the
SPP die a quiet death by August 2009. The three governments abandoned the
project by simply taking down the website and starting new projects, on
bilateral and ad hoc bases, rather than through trilateral mechanisms.
North America’s governments follow a general laissez faire
approach to integration of the economies and societies of the
NAFTA countries. Trilateralism is eschewed in favor of ad hoc
attempts at bilateral, generally short-term solutions to issues of
common concern to North Americans. Canada, Mexico, and the
United States (especially the last) prefer to conduct affairs
unilaterally, with occasional resort to bilateral initiatives to smooth
over economic or diplomatic problems.203
Perhaps trilateralism had run its course.
[I]n the absence of a compelling vision to define a modern regional
entity, and lacking institutions to translate that vision into policies,
the old patterns of behavior among the three governments remained.
This meant that the U.S. penchant for unilateralism and the Canadian
and Mexican preference for bilateralism have trumped NAFTA’s
promise of a novel trilateral partnership.204
A dozen years later, Robert A. Pastor noted again that, “[i]nstead of
tackling new transnational problems such as regulatory harmonization
together, the United States and its neighbors reverted to old habits of
bilateral, ad hoc negotiations.”205 And that was even before the Presidency of
Donald J. Trump.
C. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
Repeatedly during the 2016 Presidential election in the United States,
candidate Trump promised to withdraw from the NAFTA. 206 Trump

202. Steve Schifferes, NAFTA Trade Talks Likely to Stall, BBC (Aug. 18, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6940189.stm.
203. Zamora, supra note 180, at 644.
204. PASTOR, supra note 125, at 2.
205. Memorandum from Robert A. Pastor on Shortcut to U.S. Econ. Competitiveness (Mar. 5,
2013), https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/03/Policy_Innovation_Memo29_Pastor.pdf
206. Jared Bernstein, Trump Promises to Tear Up Trade Deals. Here’s What He Should Do,
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/14/trump-promises-to-tear-uptrade-deals-heres-what-he-should-do/?utm_term=.39161b8f69a5. See generally Time Staff,
Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, TIME (June 16, 2015),
http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/ (However, Mr. Trump also
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repeatedly pointed to the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico as emblematic of
“unfair trade deals” which the United States entered.207 His campaign stated,
that as President, he would tell NAFTA partners:
that we intend to immediately renegotiate the terms of that agreement
to get a better deal for our workers. If they don’t agree to a
renegotiation, we will submit notice that the U.S. intends to
withdraw from the deal. Eliminate Mexico’s one-side backdoor tariff
through the VAT and end sweatshops in Mexico that undercut U.S.
workers.208
In his inaugural address, President Donald J. Trump fed into the anger
of the trade.209 On January 26, 2017, President Trump tweeted, that “[the
United States] has a 60-billion-dollar trade deficit with Mexico. It has been a
one-sided deal from the beginning of NAFTA with massive numbers . . . .” 210
Maintaining that NAFTA was “a horrible deal,” President Trump opted to
renegotiate NAFTA only a day after announcing that he was ready to trigger
the article in the trade agreement to withdraw from it: “I think we’ll be
successful in the renegotiation, which, frankly, would be good because it
would be simpler.”211
It is important to note that the renegotiation of NAFTA was not the
brainchild of President Trump. As candidates for the Democratic Party’s
Presidential nomination, then Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
also both called for a new NAFTA deal.212 Seeking delegates during the Ohio
primary, both candidates criticized the deal for job losses in the state’s
promised to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a twelve-country trade agreement the
U.S. had recently signed. Trump also said, “I’ll bring back our jobs from China, from Mexico,
from Japan, from so many places. I’ll bring back our jobs, and I’ll bring back our money”).
207. Rex Nutting, Opinion: How Donald Trump Hijacked the Democrats’ Best Issue,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 30, 2016, 11:23 A.M.), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-hillaryclinton-could-beat-donald-trump-on-his-strongest-issue-2016-09-30.
208. Looking Back–Trump and Trade, THOMPSON HINE (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/looking-back-trump-and-trade._
209. Donald Trump’s Inaugural Address: Full Text as Prepared for Delivery, WASH. POST
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/20/donaldtrumps-inaugural-address-full-text-as-prepared-for-delivery/?utm_term=.cda4ee831b81.
210. Nikita Vladimirov, Trump Ripped Mexico in Tweet While Kushner Was Meeting with
Mexican Officials: Report, THE HILL (Feb. 11, 2017, 11:47 AM)
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/319080-trump-ripped-mexico-in-tweet-whilekushner-was-meeting-with-mexican.; see Ioan Grillo, Trumps’ Mexican Shakedown, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/opinion/trumps-mexican-shakedown.html.
211. Scott Horsely, With Billions at Stake, Trump Agrees to Mend NAFTA—Not End It, NPR
(Apr. 27, 2017, 5:38 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/27/525920241/with-billions-at-stake-trumpagrees-to-mend-nafta-not-end-it.
212. Adam Davidson, Clinton, Obama and NAFTA: A Non-Issue?, NPR (Feb. 26, 2008, 4:00
PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=38185288 (“The two candidates
seem to really hate NAFTA.”).
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rustbelt.213 When the Democrats took the White House in 2008, the promises
to renegotiate NAFTA went unfulfilled. That was not so with the new Trump
administration.
In a letter to Congressional leadership, U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer notified the U.S. Congress that through improvements to NAFTA,
the Trump administration looked to spark economic growth and create betterpaying jobs.214 Those improvements were not detailed.215 In August 2017,
trade negotiations commenced.216
On August 22, 2017, President Trump told a campaign–like rally
audience in Phoenix that he doubted that the United States could reach a deal
to renegotiate the NAFTA and that his administration would end up just
terminating the trade pact with Canada and the United States. “So I think
we’ll end up probably terminating NAFTA at some point, OK? Probably.”217
This occurred only five days before the first set of renegotiations had just
ended.218 And just five days before the start of a second round of talks,
President Trump announced via Twitter that he planned to withdraw from
NAFTA altogether.219 This threat lit a fire for the trade officials crafting the

213. Associated Press, Clinton, Obama Slug It Out in Ohio, CBS NEWS (Feb. 28, 2008, 4:13
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-obama-slug-it-out-in-ohio/.
214. Letter from Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Rep., to Charles E. Schumer, Democratic
Leader, Orrin Hatch, President Pro Tempore, Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House & Nancy Pelosi,
Democratic Leader (May 18, 2017) (on file with Congress).
215. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Sends NAFTA Renegotiation Notice to Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/us/politics/nafta-renegotiationtrump.html?_r=0.
216. Jorge Valencia, NAFTA Talks Could Begin as Early as August; ‘We Are Ready,’ Mexican
Official Says, FRONTERAS DESK (May 18, 2017),
http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/10679/nafta-talks-could-begin-early-august-’we-are-ready’mexican-official-says.
217. Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump’s 57 Most Outrageous Quotes From His Arizona Speech,
CNN (Aug. 22, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/politics/donald-trumparizona/index.html. See also Jethro Mullen, Trump: We’ll probably End Up Killing NAFTA ‘at
Some Point,’ CNN (Aug. 23, 2017, 3:47 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/22/investing/trumpnafta-termination/index.html; Reuters Staff, Trump Warns May Terminate NAFTA Treaty,
REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2017, 10:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-naftaidUSKCN1B30F2; Jacob Pramuk, Trump: We’ll ‘Probably’ End Up Terminating NAFTA, CNBC
(Aug. 22, 2017, 3:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/22/trump-well-probably-end-upterminating-nafta.html; President Trump Ranted For 77 Minutes in Phoenix. Here’s What He
Said, TIME (Aug. 23, 2017, 9:30 AM), http://time.com/4912055/donald-trump-phoenix-arizonatranscript/.
218. Rodrigo Cervantes, As NAFTA Talks Start, Trade Deficit Arguments Prevail,
FRONTERAS (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/10772/nafta-talks-start-tradedeficit-arguments-prevail.
219. Reuters Staff, Trump Renews Threat to Scrap NAFTA Going into Next Round of Talks,
REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2017, 8:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-naftaidUSKCN1B70NA.
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deal. More lightning speed rounds of negotiations were undertaken, some
through separate tracks—beyond the parties’ initial deadline of December
2017220 and into Spring 2018 with both Canada221 and Mexico.222 A bilateral
deal with Mexico—the United States-Mexico Trade Agreement—was
announced in late August 2018, leaving out Canada.223
After the back and forth of the lightning speed negotiations during 2018
and 2019, the parties finally reached a deal.224 The USMCA was initially
signed and agreed upon in December 2019. However, President Trump did
not sign the agreement until January 29, 2020.225 Canada agreed to the final
terms on April 3, 2020.226 Referred to in Canada as the Canada-United StatesMexico-Agreement (CUSMA) (and in French Canada as the Accord
Canada–États-Unis–Mexique (ACEUM)),227 and Tratado entre México,
Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC) in Mexico, the USMCA went into force
on July 1, 2020.228

220. Ana Swanson, Nafta Talks’ Extension May Make for Slow, Painful Demise, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/nafta-negotiators-extend-talksdelaying-its-expecteddemise.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fpolitics&action=click&contentCollection=
politics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=sec
tionfront.
221. Rodrigo Cervantes, Canadian Prime Minister Visits Mexico Amidst NAFTA Discussions,
FRONTERAS (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/10848/canadian-primeminister-visits-mexico-amidst-nafta-discussions.
222. Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Braces for the Possible Collapse of NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/world/americas/mexiconafta.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=worl
d&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=6&pgtype=sectionfr
ont&_r=0.
223. Damian Paletta, Erica Werner & David J. Lynch, Trump Announces Separate U.S.Mexico Trade Agreement, Says Canada May Join Later, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/08/27/us-mexico-reach-partial-agreementresolve-trade-conflict-step-towards-nafta-deal/?utm_term=.5b8c3d156642. See also Matthew
Rooney, Don’t Split NAFTA, NAT’L REV. (June 9, 2018),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/06/nafta-treaty-trilateral-better-than-bilateral/.
224. Ana Swanson, Canada on the Sidelines as U.S. and Mexico Near an Agreement on
NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/naftacanadamexico.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fpolitics&action=click&contentCollection=
politics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=sec
tionfront.
225. Eugene Beaulieu & Dylan Klemen, You Say USMCA or T-MEC and I Say CUSMA: The
New NAFTA - Let’s Call the Whole Thing On, 13:7 SCH. PUB. POL’Y PUBL’N. 1, 2 (Apr. 2020).
226. Id. at 1.
227. Id. at 2, n. 1.
228. Press Release, Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Rep, USMCA To Enter into Force July 1,
After United States Takes Final Procedural Steps for Implementation (Apr. 24, 2020),
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The new agreement is not exactly an earth-shattering change for the
parties. David A. Gantz wrote that “much of NAFTA has been carried over
into the USMCA.”229 The Investor-State Dispute Resolution mechanisms of
Chapter 11—the impugned procedures that allow foreign corporations to sue
sovereign countries for the expropriation, nationalization or other “taking” of
their investment—did not change much under the new agreement.230
Arbitrators are now empowered to throw out nuisance lawsuits—blatant
attempts at seeking unjust enrichment by arguing for expectation of profits
as part of the damages they claim.231 This perversion of mechanisms to
ensure fair and just compensation for foreign corporations has been part of
all trade agreements the United States has entered into since the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Chapter 11 has been the target of U.S.
politicians on both sides of the political spectrum even though the United
States has never lost a case under the provision.232 New rules to prevent
corporations from extracting hundreds of millions of dollars for “losing an
investment” must be renegotiated, at least that is what Canada and Mexico—
both of which have paid U.S. corporations dearly over the years—will seek.
Investor-State arbitration procedures under the USMCA will continue to
work outside of domestic court systems, remain anti-democratic, and
function as a corporate welfare scheme.
NAFTA’s environmental and labor side provisions, contained in socalled “side agreements” were scrapped for the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement.233 Those issues were placed inside the agreement, with
more enforcement measures.234 The new agreement provided for more deals

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/april/usmca-enter-forcejuly-1-after-united-states-takes-final-procedural-steps-implementation.
229. David A. Gantz, North America’s Shifting Supply Chains: The USMCA, COVID-19, and
the U.S.-China Trade War, CTR. FOR THE U.S. & MEX. 1, 3 (2020).
230. USMCA, supra note 31, ch. 2, art. 14.D.3(1)(a)(i)(A), n. 22.
231. See id., ch. 4.
232. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-disputesettlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274e5209a3bc9a9_story.html.
233. Mario Andrew Torrico et al., New Labor Obligations Contained in USMCA Present
Risks for Covered Employers, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-labor-obligations-contained-usmca-present-riskscovered-employers.
234. See USMCA supra note 31, chs. 23-24.
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for corporations under the guise of “America First,”235 creating boons for
multinational capital and global financial institutions.236
The USMCA provides for changes in regional content value concerning
automobiles and automobile parts.237 The focus on regional content value
rules to truly make cars in North America. The USMCA provided a
requirement that 75% of the automobiles manufacturing, must have occurred
in North America to qualify for zero tariffs (in comparison to 63.5% under
NAFTA).238 Additionally, 45% of automobile components must be made by
workers making at least $16 per hour by the year 2023.239 USMCA sections
19, 20, 23, and 24 also provide changes to digital, intellectual property (IP),
labor, and environmental standards. Investors no longer have the ability to
sue governments which policy changes damage business in the United States
and Canada; Mexico imposed restrictions on the ability to sue. 240
One of the highlights of the USMCA is the novel chapter on trade in
digital goods.241 The USMCA addresses the use and inclusion of algorithms
in trade, recognizing interactive computer services, and addresses the
liability of intermediaries regarding IP infringement. Radically, Article 19.18
addresses the availability of having public government data to promote
innovation, competition, and social development. 242 The chapter dedicated
to digital goods is visionary, making the USMCA a truly innovating regime
among modern free trade agreements.243
But the USMCA is not in ad infinitum; it provides for a five-year sunset
clause on any new agreement.244 In the end, the USMCA is likely not a

235. Lily Rothman, History/Politics: The Long History Behind Donald Trump’s ‘America
First’ Foreign Policy, TIME (Mar. 28, 2016), https://time.com/4273812/america-first-donaldtrump-history/; see also White House: ‘America First’: Read Trump’s Full United Nations
Speech, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/americafirst-read-trump-s-full-united-nations-speech-n802676.
236. Alan Rappeport, As NAFTA Talks Resume, U.S. and Canada Aren’t Budging on Key
Priorities, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/us/politics/naftatalks-us-canada.html.
237. Eric van Eyken, Is America First the End of FET?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/08/03/america-first-end-fet/.
238. David A. Gantz, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Tariffs, Customs, and
Rules of Origin, RICE U. BAKER INST. PUB. POL’Y RPT. 3 (2019).
239. Beaulieu & Klemen, supra note 225, at 5.
240. Id.
241. See generally USMCA, supra note 31, ch. 19.
242. Mira Burri, Towards a New Treaty on Digital Trade, 5 J. WORLD TRADE, 77, 90 (2021).
243. Eleanor Wragg, USMCA: A High-Water Mark for Digital Trade?, GLOBAL TRADE REV.
(July 14, 2020), https://www.gtreview.com/magazine/volume-18-issue-3/usmca-high-water-markdigital-trade/.
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panacea for all of the United States’ trade challenges.245 Experts,
stakeholders, academicians, as well as dairy farmer organizations predict that
results of the USMCA will not be so great.246
One area of focus is the impact of the USMCA on the United States labor
market. The total average wage across all education levels is expected to
increase by an average of only 0.27%.247 In comparison to baseline changes
in 2017, employment among workers with ten to twelve years of education
and thirteen to fifteen years of education is expected to increase a paltry
0.12%.248 It was no surprise that the International Union of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) opposed the USMCA. “U.S. workers have been
waiting over 25 years for a responsible trade deal that puts their interests
ahead of corporations who are fleeing our shores. They are still waiting. The
IAM will oppose NAFTA 2.0.”249
Corporations, however, will likely prosper as they did under the previous
trilateral trade agreement. “Powerful multinational corporations have used
and controlled the negotiation of trade and investment deals to facilitate
offshoring and the deregulation of the U.S. and global economy.”250 U.S
trade with Canada is expected to grow 5.9% in exports (19.1 billion), 4.8%
in imports (19.1) billion.251 U.S trade with Mexico is expected to grow 6.7%
in exports (14.2 billion) and 3.8% (12.4 billion) in imports.252
The United States International Trade Commission (USTIC) prepared a
report on the likely impact of the implementation of the USMCA. The report
was created in compliance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities
and Accountability Act of 2015.253
245. North American Business Associations Issue Joint Statement on USMCA: “USMCA is
Here, But the Work is Just Beginning,” U.S. CHAMBER COM. (July 1, 2020),
https://www.uschamber.com/international/trade-agreements/north-american-businessassociations-issue-joint-statement-usmca-usmca-here-the-work.
246. USMCA: A Bad Deal for Farmers, NAT’L FAM. FARM COALITION (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://nffc.net/usmca-a-bad-deal-forfarmers/#:~:text=In%20another%20disappointment%20for%20farmers%2C%20the%20USMCA
%20does,revoked%20following%20a%202015%20WTO%20complaint%20from%20Canada.
247. U.S.- Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on
Specific Industry Sectors, Inv. No. TPA 105-003, USITC Pub. 4889 (April 2019) [hereinafter
USMCA Impact].
248. Id. at 47.
249. International Union of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Machinists Union Opposes
USMCA (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.goiam.org/news/imail/machinists-union-opposes-usmca/.
250. See Thea M. Lee & Robert E. Scott, News from EPI: U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement–
Weak Tea, at Best, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.epi.org/press/u-s-mexicocanada-agreement-weak-tea-at-best/.
251. USMCA Impact, supra note 247, at 14.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 27.
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The statute requires the Commission to assess the likely impact of
USMCA on the U.S. economy as a whole and on specific industry
sectors, including its impact on the U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP); exports and imports; aggregate employment and
employment opportunities; the production, employment, and
competitive position of industries likely to be significantly affected
by the agreement; and the interests of U.S. consumers.254
The USTIC estimates that the USMCA would raise the United States,
“real GDP by $68.2 billion (0.35%) and U.S. employment by 176,000 jobs
(0.12%).”255 Additionally, U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico would
increase by $19.1 billion (5.9%) and $14.2 billion (6.7%), respectively. U.S.
imports from Canada and Mexico would increase by $19.1 billion (4.8%) and
$12.4 billion (3.8%), respectively. 256
The report noted the United States economy in comparison to Mexico
and Canada, as well as the prior reduction in tariffs within NAFTA, will
likely cause a minimal impact overall to the United States economy, with the
real GDP staying at baseline.257 The most significant impacts are, “reduc[ing]
policy uncertainty regarding cross-border data flows and data localization
and certain automotive rules of origin (ROOs) have the most significant
impact on the estimated results.” 258 In addition, trade disputes with the
parties in the USMCA continue into the Biden administration.259
In the end though, trilateral initiatives did not do much to tame the
border, and there has been a mixed set of results from NAFTA and SPP;
similar results are likely with the newest trade agreement—the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement. As noted above, corporations did well under
NAFTA and the SPP and they are poised to do well again under the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, particularly in the provision of digital
goods.260
Corruption reigns in Mexico, as reports from Transparency International
confirm.261 Even the USMCA negotiations were not without their own
scandal. Mexican prosecutors from the federal Attorney General’s Office

254. Id.
255. Id. at 14.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 15.
258. Id. at 15-16.
259. Gavin Bade & Andy Blatchford, Biden’s Made-in-America Push Raises Trade Tensions
at Meeting with Canada, Mexico, POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/18/joe-biden-made-in-america-tensions-canada-mexico522868.
260. USMCA Impact, supra note 247, at 171.
261. TRANSPARENCY INT’L supra note 138.
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charged former economy minister Ildefonso Guajardo, the lead negotiator for
Mexico in the USMCA negotiations, with corruption in July 2021.262 This
charge alleged that blurring of public and private dealings is not dissimilar to
that what occurred in the U.S. fundraising and personal enrichment criminal
prosecutions of the border vigilantes and in We Build the Wall, implicating
former Trump advisor Steve Bannon, nor to the fleecing of donations by
various border vigilante groups a few years ago.263 It is not unlike the
behavior exhibited by Pancho Villa when he was both a bandit and Governor
of the State of Chihuahua in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. 264
III. THE TRILATERAL RESPONSES HAVE NOT TAMED THE BORDER
In the view of the United States’ trade policymakers in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, NAFTA was necessary for economic 265 and national
security reasons.266 The three countries in the trade pact promised to increase
economies of scale by lowering trade barriers to facilitate a continent-wide
supply chain to allow for greater efficiency and creation of competitive firms
ready for the global marketplace. With the attacks of 9/11, most U.S. policies
and international agreements revolved around national security.267 After a
decade of NAFTA, the security measures that emerged after the 9/11 attacks
included principally another trilateral agreement that harmonizes rules for

262. Mexico Accuses Former USMCA Negotiator of Illicit Enrichment, BLOOMBERG TAX
(July 9, 2021, 1:48 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/mexicoaccuses-former-usmca-negotiator-of-illicit-enrichment.
263. David Holthouse, Jim Gilchrist Fired by Minuteman Project, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (July
1, 2007), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2007/jim-gilchrist-firedminuteman-project. See generally, Sonya Geis, Minuteman Project in Turmoil Over Financial
Allegations, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/12/AR2007031201297.html.
264. When Villa entered the governor’s palace in Chihuahua he took personal command
of the relief work among the residents of the town. His first act was to reduce prices so
as to permit the poor to obtain the necessary supplies. Any merchant found guilty of
charging famine prices was to be shot and his stores and property confiscated.
I. THORD-GRAY, GRINGO REBEL: MEXICO 1913-1914, 257-58 (1960).
265. MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE
DEAL WAS DONE 182 (2000).
266. “The United States has long understood that instability in Mexico could not be contained
at the border. That is the national security rationale that underlies NAFTA.” PASTOR, supra note
125, at 189.
267. Historical and national security concerns have always driven U.S. policy towards
Central America. Since the early days of the United States, American business played a
significant role in the region . . . . And despite the relatively small size of the market
offered by Central American countries, U.S. policymakers saw the promise of stable
economies and political conditions offered by greater trade and investment in the region.
Robert E. Lutz, CAFTA and Commercial Law Reform in the Americas: An Introduction, 12 SW.
J. L. TRADE AMS. 177, 177 (2006).
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transportation, travel, and other communications among the three partner
countries. The Security and Prosperity Partnership arrived in 2005, building
a security narrative into the free trade area. The USMCA added on the
harmonization and provided, among other features, the pioneer architecture
for an integrated digital goods marketplace, free of duties and administrative
challenges. This Article has focused on these trilateral initiatives to tame the
border areas, while further augmenting the regional integration and making
the borders, specifically the U.S.-Mexico border, less contested and safer.268
However, that has not happened.
Instead, these trade regimes laid the framework for a culture of
extraction of agricultural products, minerals, oil, and eventually people.
Eduardo Galeano in Open Veins of Latin America wrote:
The division of labor among nations is that some specialize in
winning and others in losing. Our part of the world, known today as
Latin America, was precocious: it has specialized in losing ever since
those remote times when Renaissance Europeans ventures across the
ocean and buried their teeth into the throats of the Indian
civilizations. Centuries passed and Latin America perfected its role.
We are no longer in the era of marvels when fact surpassed fable and
imagination was shamed by the trophies of conquest—the lodes of
gold, the mountains of silver. But our region still works as a menial.
It continues to exist at the service of others’ needs, as a source and
reserve of oil and iron, of copper and meat, of fruit and coffee, the
raw materials and foods destined for rich countries which profit more
from consuming them than Latin America does from producing
them.269
Indeed, the monocultural economies of Latin America continue while
the secondary and tertiary production processes—wherein much of the
surplus value is extracted—provide profits for the developed world. The
legal frameworks under the Washington Consensus, contained in the free
trade agreements, and a whole host of other neoliberal policies, allow for
legitimated extraction of natural resources and, in turn, profit. In Plunder:
When the Rule of Law is Illegal, Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader explored:
the mechanisms through which the transnational rule of law, as a
deeply Western idea, has led incrementally to patterns of global
plunder, a process initiated by the expansion of Euro-American
society worldwide, and now continued by nations, in particularly the
268. Cf. “Globalization is a process that generates contradictory spaces, characterized by
contestation, internal differentiation, continuous border crossings.” SASSEN, supra note 45, at
xxxiv.
269. EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE
PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT 1 (Monthly Rev. Press 1997) (1973).
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USA, and multinational corporate entities independent of explicit
political or military colonialism.270
More plunder has come with the protection of big tech’s data harvesting
business model that Chapter 19 allows.271 Extraction is present also in
agricultural exchange, mining, cattle ranching, which became the subsequent
priorities for economic growth, and in railroad construction, which was
designed to connect the natural resources of the Mexican North to the
marketplaces in the United States.272 These industries had a ready-made
workforce—the Mexican and Mexican-American population were ready to
work in those industries for wages necessary to survive after being
dispossessed of their lands.
Extraction is also baked into the ISDS system of the USMCA, created
to assist corporations in dealing with lost investments or dashed expectations
of profits. There is indeed profit in that space. It is not just human traffickers,
drugs traffickers, and other nefarious groups plying their trades along the
border, but also other individuals who can access the international system
that can hook into the food trough of transnational trade. It is multinational
enterprises, transnational corporations, international capital markets, and
individuals who profit from this system.
The Washington Consensus forced broad structural changes in
developing countries like Mexico, transforming the state to be less an engine
of economic growth and order and instead allowing for the private sector to
instigate economic growth and wealth.273 The resulting market-friendly
policy prescriptions, however, did not produce economic benefits for the
working class, Indigenous Peoples, and marginalized groups around Latin
America.274 Privatization, market liberalization, and free trade have, for the
270. MATTEI & NADER, supra note 19, at 2.
271. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Megan Hogan, Digital Agreements: What’s Covered, What’s
Possible, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Oct. 2021),
https://www.piie.com/reader/publications/policy-briefs/digital-agreements-whats-covered-whatspossible.
272. GANSTER & LOREY, supra note 72, at 36 (“Often the railroad tied Mexican communities
more closely to the United States than to the Mexican interior”).
273. “Given Latin America’s long history of protectionism, the trade reform was dramatic.”
MICHAEL REID, FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN AMERICA’S SOUL 137 (2010).
274. Foreign investment is, of course, a very good thing. The more of it, the better.
Stable currencies are good, too, as are free trade and transparent banking practices and
the privatization of state-owned industries and every other remedy in the Western
pharmacopoeia. Yet we continually forget that global capitalism has been tried before.
In Latin America, for example, reforms directed at creating capitalist systems have been
tried at least four times since independence from Spain in the 1820s. Each time, after the
initial euphoria, Latin Americans swung back from capitalist and market economy
policies.
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 3 (2000).
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large part, benefited corporations but did not bring any noticeable trickle
down economic effects.275
The trade treaties provided some of the underpinnings of a regime of
plunder. The resulting democracy deficit, challenge to national sovereignty,
disregard for Indigenous Peoples, labor movements, and environmental
concerns has angered the lower socio-economic class in Latin America and
ignited a new kind of civil society direct action being asserted
contemporaneously with the trade negotiations themselves. This reaction to
the negative aspects of globalization was exacerbated by the world financial
crisis. Ntina Tzouvala explained:
Ours is a time of crises. A decade after the global financial crash the
edifice known as the “liberal international order” is under profound
pressure. Worryingly, some of the alternative competing for
hegemony offer an even more violent, exploitative and
environmentally destructive future than the current configuration. 276
IV. CONCLUSION
The illicit drug industry has grown exponentially.277 It is the economic
space in which there is still job growth. After all, with few well-paying,
legitimate jobs available, people turn to illegal activities.278 Worldwide the
illicit drug industry is estimated to be worth $300 billion annually. 279
Mexican drug cartels annually supply billions of dollars’ worth of cocaine,
marijuana, methamphetamines, and MDMA to the United States.280 Over

275. See Teddy Chestnut & Anita Joseph, The IMF and the Washington Consensus: A
Misunderstood and Poorly Implemented Development Strategy, COUNCIL HEMISPHERIC AFFS.
(July 17, 2005), https://www.coha.org/the-imf-and-the-washington-consensus-a-misunderstoodand-poorly-implemented-development-strategy/. See generally, Joseph Stiglitz, Broadening Our
Thinking on Vulnerability, Human Development Reports, UN DEV. PROGRAMME (Oct. 02, 2017).
276. NTINA TZOUVALA, CAPITALISM AS CIVILISATION: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
19 (2020).
277. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41576, MEXICO: ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 15 (2020).
278. Briseida Valencia Soto, Controversial Alternative for a Trapped Labor Force: Mexico’s
Formal Employment and Illicit Drug Production, COUNCIL HEMISPHERIC AFFS. (July 5, 2016),
https://www.coha.org/controversial-alternative-for-a-trapped-labor-force-mexicos-formalemployment-and-illicit-drug-production/.
279. TOM WAINWRIGHT, NARCONOMICS: HOW TO RUN A DRUG CARTEL 3 (2016) (“[The
narcotics industry’s] products are designed, manufactured, transported, marketed, and sold to a
quarter of a billion consumers around the world”).
280. DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, 2020 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 69
(2021), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/dir-00821%202020%20national%20drug%20threat%20assessment_web.pdf.
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twelve years some $3.3 billion has been spent to fight it through the Mérida
Initiative.281
As Tom Wainwright explained more than half a decade ago (and nothing
has changed since), “[n]ew bulletins feature little else: every week brought
new stories of corrupted cops, assassinated officials, and massacre and
bloody massacre of narcotraficantes, by the army or each other. This was the
war on drugs, and the drugs were winning.”282 The war on drugs and criminal
procedure reform are indeed linked to regional trade: the enforcement of
contracts, transparent legal rules, and judicial independence are all
components and all lead to a culture of the rule of law. However, after 9/11
the U.S. government has been looking at the U.S.-Mexico border through the
national security lens first, and then it thinks about it through an international
trade lens.
Back at the United States Embassy in Mexico City in November 2005,
we briefed the U.S. Ambassador on our work in training prosecutors and
judges in new oral trials that were being instituted and began in different
states throughout Mexico283 as Mexico moved away from the closed, written
trials of its past inquisitorial system. We even talked to Los Pinos, Mexico’s
Executive Branch, about assisting the transitioning of the Superior Court of
Mexico City, part of the Federal District’s jurisdiction, from an adversarial
criminal procedure to an inquisitorial one. This laid the groundwork for what
would eventually be the Mérida Initiative a few years later, a program that
provided human capacity building and other training contracts to the law
school at which I was on faculty.
One of the pillars of the Mérida Initiative, which was furthered under the
Obama administration, was the reform of the justice system.284 This effort to
reform the laws in Mexico also runs counterintuitive to the Mexican culture
which leads to inefficient law making and inconsistent law enforcement.285
With its emphasis on jury trials in the reformed criminal justice system,
Mexico has also seen plea bargains. This approach seems indifferent to
context in Mexico and undermines the foundation for improved outcomes in
the criminal justice system.286 The federal government, too, was looking at
281. CLAIRE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10578, MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF THE
MERIDA INITIATIVE, FY 2008-2022 1 (2021).
282. WAINWRIGHT, supra note 279, at 2.
283. James Cooper, Slow Road to Legal Reforms in Mexico, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov.
27, 2006, at B7 (on file with author).
284. CLAIRE RIBANDO STEELE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41349, U.S.MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MERIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 15 (June 29, 2017).
285. Deborah M. Weissman, Remaking Mexico: Law Reform as Foreign Policy, 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1471, 1504 (2013).
286. Id.
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this transition work as Mexico modernized its judiciary, prosecution, and
public defense institutions.
When we first came into the Ambassador’s office, I thought I had
introduced my colleague—a Chilean prosecutor working on the rule of law
reform as a consultant in all the Americas—formally to the man sporting the
Texas cowboy boots, as he watched the images unfold on television. We were
in Mexico to promote efforts of the Mexico White House—Los Pinos—and
to provide some regional context for all the stakeholders in the legal sector—
law schools, bar associations, law enforcement institutions, and regulatory
agencies.287 We briefed the transplanted Texan about burgeoning rule of law
reforms in Mexico and encouraged the Embassy’s collaboration in legal
education programs that we were rolling out in support of many of the thirtyone Mexican states taking on these reforms.
Over half a decade before Chile had implemented oral trials in its
country, it successfully transitioned various regions’ criminal procedure from
the inquisitorial model to a more adversarial model.288 Mexico had an
additional burden of reforming its procedures on a number of matters under
the Security and Prosperity Partnership and a harmonization program post9/11 and in the context of national security and customs bureaucracy
liberalization. We did not get very far in our briefing when the Chilean
prosecutor colleague and I looked over and saw the live TV images of
protests in Argentina raging on. More smoke billowed out of another bank—
this time, a branch of BankBoston. Tony Garza pointed away from the
television to a Chuck Close painting that hung on his office wall. He showed
us a catalog from a celebrated Mexican art collection that featured the
painting. A few minutes later, after we walked out of the office, my Chilean
colleague looked at me and asked, “so when do we get to meet the
Ambassador?”

287. See PROYECTO ACCESO, www.proyectoacceso.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
288. James M. Cooper, Competing Legal Culture and Legal Reform: The Battle of Chile, 29
MICH. J. INT’L L. 501, 520 (2008).

